Multi-product firms and product quality by Manova, Kalina & Yu, Zhihong
ISSN 2042-2695 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1469 
February 2017 
Multi-Product Firms and Product Quality 
Kalina Manova 
Zhihong Yu 
    
Abstract 
We examine the global operations of multi-product firms. We present a flexible heterogeneous-firm 
trade model with either limited or strong scope for quality differentiation. Using customs data for 
China during 2002-2006, we empirically establish that firms allocate activity across products in line 
with a product hierarchy based on quality. Firms vary output quality across their products by using 
inputs of different quality levels. Their core competence is in varieties of superior quality that 
command higher prices but nevertheless generate higher sales. In markets where they offer fewer 
products, firms concentrate on their core varieties by dropping low-quality peripheral goods on the 
extensive margin and by shifting sales towards top-quality products on the intensive margin. The 
product quality ladder also governs firms' export dynamics, both in general and in response to the 
exogenous removal of MFA quotas on textiles and apparel. Our results inform the drivers and 
measurement of firm performance, the effects of trade reforms, and the design of development 
policies. 
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1 Introduction
How rms organize production and sales across multiple product lines has important micro and
macro implications. At the micro level, bigger and more productive rms sell more products,
with the majority of their sales, exports and prots coming from a few core products (e.g.
Bernard et al 2009, Arkolakis-Muendler 2010). Moreover, reallocations across products improve
rm productivity and performance in response to shocks such as trade reforms or exchange
rate movements (e.g. Bernard et al 2010, 2011, Gopinath-Neiman 2014, Chatterjee et al 2013).
At the macro level, multi-product rms capture an overwhelming and disproportionately large
share of production, trade, and employment. Reallocations across heterogeneous rms shape
aggregate productivity, the welfare gains from trade, and the aggregate impact of idiosyncratic
and systemic shocks, especially with granularities in the rm size distribution (e.g. Arkolakis et al
2012, Melitz-Redding 2015, Pavcnik 2002, Gabaix 2011, di Giovanni et al 2014, Gaubert-Itskhoki
2016). Yet despite its implications for rm performance, aggregate welfare and inequality, the
allocation of activity across products within multi-product rms remains poorly understood.
Prima facie evidence for China suggests that product quality di¤erentiation may be important
(Appendix Table 1). Firms that export products at higher average prices and rms that vary
prices more across their product range attain higher exports. Controlling for initial trade activity,
such rms also achieve faster export growth. Although output prices may not directly reect
product quality, similar patterns hold when output quality is inferred from data on export prices
and quantities, or proxied with the price or inferred quality of imported inputs. In addition, rms
with higher productivity, employment, skill-, capital-, advertising and R&D intensity have higher
average prices and quality, as well as greater price and quality dispersion across products.1 These
ndings indicate that quality di¤erentiation across rms and across products within rms may
be key to understanding rmsexport performance and the di¤erential e¤ects of trade reforms
across the rm size and worker skill distribution.
This paper examines the global operations of multi-product rms in light of the motivating
facts. We present a exible heterogeneous-rm trade model that characterizes the behavior of
multi-product rms with either limited or strong scope for quality di¤erentiation. Using rich cus-
toms data for China during 2002-2006, we empirically establish that rms allocate activity across
products in line with strong quality di¤erentiation. They observe a product hierarchy governed
by quality which determines how they participate in di¤erent markets and how they respond to
changes in economic conditions over time. First, multi-product rms vary output quality across
their product range by using inputs of di¤erent quality levels. Second, rmscore competence
is in varieties of superior quality that command higher prices but nevertheless generate higher
sales than cheaper goods of lower quality. Third, in markets where they o¤er fewer products,
1 Inferring unobserved product quality is an important methodological contribution of our analysis that we
discuss below. We calculate the average and the standard deviation of observed prices and inferred quality across
products after rst demeaning by product xed e¤ects. We describe the data sample, variable denition, and
empirical specications behind these conditional correlations in the notes to Appendix Table 1.
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rms concentrate activity in their core varieties by dropping low-quality peripheral goods on the
extensive margin and by shifting sales towards top-quality products on the intensive margin.
Finally, the systematic reallocation of activity across the product quality ladder guides rms
export dynamics, both in general and in response to the exogenous removal of MFA quotas on
textiles and apparel.
Our theoretical framework illustrates how the possibility for vertical di¤erentiation a¤ects the
production and sales decisions of multi-product rms, relative to a world with only horizontal
di¤erentiation. We refer to these economic environments as quality sorting and e¢ ciency sorting,
respectively. In the model, rm-level ability and rm-product-specic expertise draws create
exogenous variation in production e¢ ciency across rms and across products within rms. Under
quality sorting, rms can choose to make products of higher quality at a higher marginal cost
by assembling more expensive inputs of higher quality. The exogenous variation in production
e¢ ciency induces endogenous variation in quality across rms and products, as well as in product
scope and sales prole across rms. Abler companies o¤er higher quality of any given good,
sell more goods, enter more markets, and earn higher revenues. Within a rm, more expensive
varieties of higher quality generate higher bilateral and worldwide sales. Firms vary their product
scope across heterogeneous country markets, and expand their product range by progressively
adding goods in decreasing order of price and quality. Under e¢ ciency sorting by contrast, there
is no quality di¤erentiation in the market place, and higher productivity is associated with lower
marginal costs, lower prices, and higher sales. Firms now follow product hierarchies based on
production e¢ ciency, and all predictions for input and output prices are reversed.
Guided by this conceptual framework, we analyze the operations of multi-product rms using
rm-level data for China on the universe of export and import transactions during 2002-2006. An
important advantage of these data is that we observe the price and sales for all of a rms exports
by destination and product, as well as the price of all of its imported intermediate inputs. On the
sales side, this allows us to examine the relationship between product scope and the distribution
of product prices and sales across the di¤erent markets in which the same rm operates. On the
production side, we are able to implement a new methodology we develop for matching multiple
inputs (and their prices) to multiple output products (and their prices).
We perform four empirical exercises, and conclude that multi-product rms organize oper-
ations in a manner consistent with quality sorting but not with e¢ ciency sorting. First, we
establish evidence for the most distinctive prediction of quality sorting: the price-sales prole
of multi-product rms. We show that export prices are positively correlated with worldwide
exports across products within a rm-year and with bilateral sales across products within rm-
destination-years. Model-consistent estimates of product quality are likewise positively associated
with export revenues across a rmsproduct range, where we infer unobserved quality from ob-
served price and quantity data as in Khandelwal (2008). These results do not appear to be driven
by variable mark-ups: They are robust to controlling for rmsmarket power with their share of
the relevant (country-)product market. They are also stronger for di¤erentiated goods and for
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advertising- and R&D intensive industries with greater scope for quality upgrading.2
Second, we provide empirical support for the idea that rms use inputs of varying quality in
order to manufacture products of varying quality. We document that input prices are positively
correlated with output prices across products within a rm-year, even when we account for rms
market share in input and output markets. In the absence of detailed information on domestic
inputs or direct measures of product quality, we use the prices that producers pay for imported
intermediates to proxy the quality of their inputs.3 We exploit detailed input-output tables for
China to allocate rmsmultiple imported inputs to the production of their multiple outputs,
and we thereby obtain an input price index for each output product. Our results are stable
across several variants of this assignment technique.
Third, we demonstrate that rmsproduct scope and allocation of activity across products
are directly linked through a product hierarchy characterized by quality.4 We rank the products
of each rm based on their global sales, price, or inferred quality. Looking across the di¤erent
markets that an exporter serves, we nd that rms systematically shift activity towards their
core top-ranked varieties in markets where they o¤er fewer products. On the extensive margin,
they drop cheaper, lower-quality goods that place lower in their product ladder. On the intensive
margin, they skew sales towards their best-selling, most expensive, highest-quality products.
Finally, we show that quality sorting governs multi-product rms response to changes in
economic conditions over time. We agnostically study the export dynamics of all rms surviving
from the beginning to the end of our panel, without taking a stance on why they choose to
adjust trade activity. We also examine how surviving exporters in the textiles and apparel
industry respond to a specic exogenous trade shock, namely the removal of export quotas
under the Multi-Fiber Agreement in 2005. Both exercises reveal that rms expand (contract)
their product scope and global exports by adding (dropping) lower-ranked varieties along the
quality ladder and by reducing (increasing) the concentration of sales in top-ranked products.
We contribute to the international trade literatures on multi-product rms and on rm het-
erogeneity in e¢ ciency and quality (e.g. Bernard et al 2010, 2011, Melitz et al 2014, Eckel-Neary
2010, Verhoogen 2008, Kugler-Verhoogen 2012, Hallak-Sivadasan 2013, Iacovone-Javorcik 2012,
Manova-Zhang 2012). We build on insights from both literatures, and emphasize how their
interaction enriches our understanding of multi-product rms. Theoretically, we highlight the
role of quality sorting by presenting a general conceptual framework with minimal assumptions
about consumer preferences and market structure. Methodologically, we propose novel strategies
2Variable mark-ups are unlikely to drive our results on theoretical grounds either, because the correlation
between prices and revenues remains positive (negative) under quality (e¢ ciency) sorting under various demand
and market structures. See Section 2.2.1 for more details.
3This is consistent with evidence in Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) of a positive correlation between the prices
that Colombian plants pay for their imported and domestic inputs.
4Di¤erential demand shocks across products and markets can induce rms to deviate from perfectly observing
a xed product hierarchy. Several checks we perform in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.4 suggest that such deviations are
indeed present. See Eaton et al (2011), Armenter-Koren (2014), and Head et al (2014) for related work on the
stability of destination and product hierarchies across rms and cities.
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for proxying product quality and for mapping multiple inputs to multiple outputs within rms.
Empirically, we corroborate and extend concurrent evidence in Eckel et al (2015) that Mexican
rms earn higher domestic and global revenues from their more expensive varieties.
We also shed light on the economic impact of globalization. Reallocations across rms and
within-rm productivity upgrading mediate welfare gains from trade, with reallocations across
products key to the latter (e.g. Melitz-Redding 2013, Burstein-Melitz 2013, Bustos 2011, Bernard
et al 2011, Mayer et al 2016). However, nancial and labor market frictions distort the pattern
of trade activity within and across rms and their response to trade reforms (e.g. Manova 2013,
Helpman et al 2010, Cosar et al 2016). Separately, more successful exporters hire more skilled
workers and pay higher wages, while sophisticated inputs and skilled labor are complementary in
the production of output quality (e.g. Verhoogen 2008, Bernard et al 2012). In light of this, our
ndings suggest that quality-driven reallocations across products within rms are important in
understanding how trade liberalization impacts rm performance and aggregate welfare, as well
as inequality through di¤erential adjustments along the rm size and worker skill distribution.
More broadly, we speak to fundamental questions in industrial organization about rms
production and sales decisions. Standard balance-sheet data make it di¢ cult to study these
questions because they report total rm revenues and input purchases, with no price series or
break-down by product and market. By exploiting customs records on the universe of rms
export and import transactions, we add three insights to IO evidence based on case studies of
specic industries and markets. First, our ndings for the relationship between product scope
and sales distribution across products are inconsistent with constant mark-ups featured in models
with CES preferences and monopolistic competition. Instead, they point to variable mark-ups
that emerge for example in models with CES preferences and linear demand or in models with
cross-product synergies or cannibalization (e.g. Melitz et al 2014, Eckel-Neary 2010, Dhingra
2013). Second, the variation in marginal costs, quality, mark-ups and prices across rms and
across products within rms complicates the measurement of rm productivity and mark-ups,
and validates recent work that aims to address it (e.g. de Loecker-Warzynski 2012, de Loecker et
al 2016). Third, this implies that micro and macro analyses that rely on price data need to take
quality and mark-up variation into account. For instance, this applies to studies of exchange
rate pass-through to producer and consumer prices (e.g. Gopinath et al 2011) and to the design
and implementation of anti-dumping and competition policies.
Lastly, we inform policy-relevant questions about export promotion in developing countries as
a means to economic growth. While policy debates often center on improving cost competitive-
ness, our analysis indicates that quality upgrading is key to rmsexport success. This suggests
that policy makers may want to encourage investment not only in production e¢ ciency, but also
in quality capabilities. Recent evidence on the e¤ects of import liberalization is consistent with
the role we document for imported intermediates in producing high-quality products: Access to
a wider range of foreign inputs and to foreign inputs of superior quality than those domestically
available enables rms to expand product scope, productivity and quality (e.g. Amiti-Konings
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2007, Gopinath-Neiman 2014, Halpern et al 2015, de Loecker et al 2016, Goldberg et al 2010,
Fan et al 2015, Bas-StraussKahn 2015). Equally important is access to skilled labor and e¤ective
management practices (e.g. Verhoogen 2008, Bloom et al 2016).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 develop the model and
its testable predictions. Sections 4 and 5 introduce the data and present the empirical results.
The last section concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
How do multi-product rms organize their global production and sales activities when there is
potential for both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation in the market space? In this section,
we characterize multi-product rmsbehavior when they simultaneously compete on production
e¢ ciency and product quality. We focus on three decisions that rms make in order to maximize
prots: the optimal range of products and markets, the optimal quality of each product, and the
optimal distribution of quality, prices, and sales across products and markets. We identify the
key economic mechanisms that govern these decisions, and derive empirically testable predictions
that allow us to validate them in the data. We emphasize that both the presence and the
scope for quality di¤erentiation critically a¤ect observable rm outcomes. While the nature of
consumer demand and rm competition matter, they do not qualitatively impact the role of
quality di¤erentiation.
We examine multi-product, multi-quality rms in a stylized conceptual framework with min-
imal assumptions about the underlying demand, production and market structure. This exible
specication illustrates the generality of our theoretical predictions in a transparent manner. We
show in an Online Appendix how our main propositions can be formally derived from closed-form
solutions under concrete assumptions about consumer preferences (CES and linear demand), pro-
duction technology (quantity and quality production functions with xed and variable costs), and
market structure (monopolistic competition).5 Our theoretical results, and the interpretation of
our empirical ndings in their light, would thus be valid both in more general settings than we
consider here and in fully specied frameworks such as those in the Online Appendix.
2.1 Production e¢ ciency and product quality
Consider a world with J + 1 countries in which heterogeneous rms can produce multiple hor-
izontally and vertically di¤erentiated goods.6 Let consumersutility in country j be increasing
5 In the Online Appendix, we incorporate e¢ ciency and quality variation across rms and across products within
rms into two existing models of multi-product rms: Bernard-Redding-Schott (2010) and Melitz-Mayer-Ottaviano
(2014). In the former case we follow closely the analysis in Bloom et al (2016).
6Our theoretical propositions hold whether rms manufacture a granular set or a continuum of products. We
consider the former in this section for expositional purposes and in the interest of a transparent mapping between
theory and empirics; the Online Appendix illustrates the robustness of our predictions to the latter scenario.
Measurement error resulting from the aggregation of unobserved varieties at the barcode level to observed product
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in product variety, product quantity and product quality, such that demand xji for variety i
is increasing in its quality qi, decreasing in its price pji, and increasing in aggregate demand
Rj and a quality-adjusted aggregate price index Pj , xji

pji
 
; qi;
+
Rj
+
; Pj
+

. We dene quality as
any intrinsic characteristic or taste preference that improves the consumer appeal of a product
given its price. This implies that observed output prices will reect the combined e¤ect of both
objective and subjective dimensions of product quality, while observed input prices will capture
only the former. Our empirical analysis will encompass both interpretations as we will examine
evidence on both output and input prices.
In order to begin production, rms have to incur sunk entry costs associated with research
and product development. Firms face ex-ante uncertainty about their production e¢ ciency, and
discover it only after completing this irreversible investment. The success of R&D will generally
di¤er across potential product lines within a rm. A rms production e¢ ciency in variety i
can therefore be thought of as the product 'i of a rm-wide ability draw ' and a rm-product
specic expertise draw i, assumed independent of each other.
Two factors determine rmsmarginal production cost ci: their capacity 'i to assemble
given inputs e¢ ciently and the marginal cost of their inputs wi, where ci = wi'i . In the absence
of quality di¤erentiation across inputs, all producers would face the same input cost. This will
no longer be the case in the presence of quality di¤erentiation, as rms can endogenously choose
to use di¤erent inputs.
When there is scope for vertical di¤erentiation, we assume that the technology for quality
production exhibits two properties. First, manufacturing goods of higher quality is associated
with higher marginal input costs because it requires the use of high-quality intermediate inputs,
specialized equipment, and skilled workers.7 Second, there is complementarity between produc-
tion e¢ ciency and input quality. Such complementarity could be attributed, for example, to
the heightened importance of minimizing production errors and ensuring quality control when
processing more sophisticated intermediates. These minimal assumptions will be su¢ cient to
generate rich predictions. They are moreover consistent with prior evidence of positive correla-
tions among product quality, output prices, input prices, wages, and management competence
across rms within narrow industries (Verhoogen 2008, Kugler-Verhoogen 2012, Manova-Zhang
2012, Crozet et al 2009, Iacovone-Javorcik 2010, Bloom et al 2016).
Finally, rms face xed operation costs of headquarter services f and xed management
costs fp for each active product line. This will imply that companies with di¤erent ability
draws will choose to produce a di¤erent number of products. Entering each foreign market j
necessitates additional headquarter services fj associated with customs, regulatory compliance,
and the maintenance of distribution networks. As a result, some low-ability domestic sellers
will not become exporters or will supply some but not all countries. Finally, exporting entails
categories can bridge theoretical predictions for product continua to empirical patterns for product granularity.
7 In turn, higher-quality intermediate inputs and more specialized equipment are presumably more expensive
because they are produced by more skilled workers that earn a higher wage.
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additional destination-product specic xed costs fjp, which reect market research, advertising,
product customization and standardization. There are also iceberg transportation costs such that
 j units of a good need to be shipped for 1 unit to arrive. Trade costs are bilateral but we have
suppressed the subscripts indicating the exporting country for simplicity. Because of these trade
costs, rms will not o¤er every product they sell at home in every foreign market they enter.
2.2 Firm behavior
2.2.1 Quality and price setting
Upon entry, rms observe their full vector of draws f';i; i 2 
ig, and decide whether to exit
immediately or to commence production. If they begin operations, they determine which prod-
ucts i to manufacture, which country markets j to serve, and which products to o¤er in each
market. To build intuition, we consider a static world in which rms produce a single quality
version of each product in their portfolio and there are no supply or demand interdependencies
across destination-products within rms. This allows us to illustrate the key mechanisms at play
in a tractable environment that reduces the rmsprot maximization problem to a series of
separable decisions.
A manufacturer will maximize total prots by separatetely maximizing the global prots that
it could potentially generate from each product. In particular, a rm with ability ' and product
expertise i will simultaneously choose the optimal input cost wi and thereby output quality qi;
whether to enter market j (i.e. Zji = 1) or not (i.e. Zji = 0); and the optimal price pji and
quantity xji to o¤er in country j. This maximization problem can be represented as follows:
max
fwi;Zji;pji;xjig
i ('; i) =
X
j
ji ('; i) = (1)
=
X
j
Zji [pji ('; i; wi)xji ('; i; wi)  Cji (ci; xji; fpj ;  j)]
s.t. xji = xji (pji; qi; Rj ; Pj) , ci =
wi
'i
and qi = qi ('; i; wi) .
Firms are atomistic and take aggregate demand Rj and price indices Pj as given. The total
cost of manufacturing and delivering quantity xji to market j is denoted Cji

ci
+
; xji
+
; fpj
+
;  j
+

. It
is assumed to increase with marginal costs ci, quantity xji, xed and variable production and
distribution costs fpj and  j . In the case of domestic sales, Zdi = 1, d = 1, and xed costs
correspond to the product-specic overhead costs fp. Recall that ceteris paribus, demand xji is
increasing in quality qi and decreasing in price pji. Moreover, quality is increasing and super-
modular in input costs wi and production e¢ ciency 'i, while marginal costs ci are increasing
in input costs and decreasing in production e¢ ciency. Although general, these properties allow
us to characterize key aspects of rm behavior in equilibrium.
In this environment, the technological complementarity between rm capability and input
quality in the production of output quality implies that rms with exogenously higher production
e¢ ciency 'i will endogenously choose to use more expensive, higher-quality inputs and thereby
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assemble higher-quality products, such that wi

'i
+

and qi

'i
+
; wi
+

in the spirit of Kugler-
Verhoogen (2012).8 This will generate quality di¤erences across rms competing in the same
product category, and induce each rm to vary input and output quality across its product
range in response to the exogenous variation in its expertise i across products.
To x ideas, it is conveninent to express the endogenous input costs as a function of the
exogenous production e¢ ciency wi ('; i) = ('i)
+1,    1, whereby marginal costs become
ci ('; i) = ('i)
. This formulation permits a transparent examination of the implications of
quality di¤erentiation for various rm outcomes. It is without loss of generality as any monotonic
transformation of these functions would preserve our qualitative results. The parameter  governs
the sensitivity of production costs and implicitly of output quality with respect to input quality
and production capacity. It can be thought of as the scope for quality di¤erentiation from the
consumers perspective or the return to quality di¤erentiation from the producers perspective.
Consider the variation across rms manufacturing the same product category. Exogenously
more e¢ cient rms will have endogenously (weakly) lower marginal costs if either (i) products
are not vertically di¤erentiated (i.e.  =  1) or (ii) products are vertically di¤erentiated and
more e¢ cient rms use higher-quality inputs, but marginal costs do not increase su¢ ciently
quickly with quality (i.e.  1 <   0). Conversely, exogenously more e¢ cient rms will have
endogenously higher marginal costs if (iii) products are vertically di¤erentiated, more e¢ cient
rms use higher-quality inputs, and marginal costs rise su¢ ciently quickly with quality (i.e.
 > 0). This also applies to the variation in production e¢ ciency and marginal costs across
products within rms.
Adopting the nomenclature in the prior literature, we will describe scenarios (i) and (ii) as
e¢ ciency sorting and scenario (iii) as quality sorting. Note that while quality sorting implies
the presence of quality di¤erentiation, e¢ ciency sorting does not conrm its absence.
In any given market j, rms will charge a price equal to their marginal cost plus an optimal
mark-up that generally depends on the nature of consumer demand and market competition. In
the absence of dynamic strategic interaction among rms, a seller has no incentive to underprice
a competitor with lower marginal costs. In a wide class of standard models, the equilibrium
ranking of prices across rm-products will therefore inherit the underlying ranking of marginal
costs despite the possibility of variable mark-ups, pji

ci
+
;  j
+

.
We illustrate this point with three concrete examples. Under CES demand and monopolistic
competition as in Melitz (2003), all rms extract the same constant mark-up above marginal
cost, determined by the demand elasticity of substitution across varieties. Deviating from either
assumption about the market structure creates incentives for variable mark-ups. Under CES
8Kugler-Verhoogen (2012) and Johnson (2012) show that economies of scale in quality production would gener-
ate similar predictions. Manufacturing a higher-quality product might entail higher xed costs if it requires more
complex assembly processes, more expensive equipment, stricter quality control or more managerial oversight.
More productive rms that expect to capture a bigger market share by charging lower quality-adjusted prices
would then be incentivized to produce higher-quality goods.
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demand and Bertrand competition as in Bernard et al (2003), the most e¢ cient supplier of a
good captures the entire market by pricing either at the monopolistically competitive level or
at the marginal cost of the second most e¢ cient potential supplier, whichever is lower. Under
linear demand and monopolistic competition as in Melitz-Ottaviano (2008), rmsoptimal mark-
up depends on their marginal cost relative to a choke price at which demand falls to zero, which
is governed by demand elasticities and the overall competitiveness in a market.
In all three set-ups, rm-products with exogenously higher production e¢ ciency will sell at
lower prices under e¢ ciency sorting and at higher prices under quality sorting. In other words,
pji

'i
 

if   0 and pji

'i
+

if  > 0. With constant mark-ups, this directly reects the
variation in marginal costs across rms and products. With variable mark-ups, abler producers
extract higher mark-ups than less able competitors selling varieties of the same product. Across
products within a rm, core goods with higher expertise receive higher mark-ups than peripheral
goods with lower expertise. In the case of quality sorting, a rms higher-quality products thus
sell at higher prices both because they entail higher marginal costs and because they secure
bigger mark-ups. In the case of e¢ ciency sorting, a rms more e¢ ciently produced goods sell
at lower prices despite receiving higher mark-ups because of their lower marginal costs.9
This framework demonstrates how quality di¤erentiation importantly a¤ects the relationship
between prices, revenues and prots across active rms and products in a given market j. Since
consumer demand decreases with quality-adjusted prices, varieties associated with higher pro-
duction e¢ ciency will always generate higher sales revenues and prots, such that rji

'i
+

and ji

'i
+

regardless of the scope for quality di¤erentiation. Under e¢ ciency sorting (i.e.
  0), rm-products with lower marginal costs 'i thus command lower prices and earn higher
revenues and prots as in Bernard et al (2010) and Melitz et al (2014). By contrast, these
patterns are reversed under quality sorting (i.e.  > 0): Within a given product category, more
successful rms now enjoy bigger revenues and prots despite charging higher prices because
they o¤er products of superior quality. Across products within a rm, more expensive varieties
are of better quality and bring higher revenues and prots.
We have abstracted away from the possibility for cross-product interdependencies in produc-
tion or consumption in order to emphasize the distinction between e¢ ciency and quality sorting.
While cross-product synergies or cannibalization could a¤ect rmsproduct scope, pricing strat-
egy and sales prole, they would not reorder products in rmsproduct hierarchy in terms of
production e¢ ciency or product quality. As a result, they would not qualitatively change the
9Allowing for dynamic strategic pricing behavior might nuance these theoretical predictons, but it would not
a¤ect the interpretation of our empirical results. If rms strategically lower or raise all mark-ups across their
product range, our results for the variation across products within rms would still hold. If rms strategically
increase the spread of mark-ups between core and peripheral goods, this would amplify forces that we already
account for. Finally, if rms strategically decrease the spread of mark-ups between core and peripheral goods,
the predicted correlation between prices and revenues across products within rms would be less positive or more
negative. This would work against us nding evidence for quality di¤erentiation as we do.
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key predictions for rm behavior in Propositions 1-4 that we take to the data.10
2.2.2 Activity across multiple products
The variation in exogenous production e¢ ciency and endogenous product quality across rms
and products gives rise to systematic patterns in rmsmarket entry decisions Zji. A key feature
of this extensive margin is the observance of a product hierarchy from core to peripheral goods
that is governed by the scope for quality di¤erentiation.
Consumer love of variety and the presence of product-specic overhead costs fp imply that
no rm will export a product without also selling it at home. Firms will therefore manufacture
only goods for which they can earn non-negative prots domestically. Since prots increase in
production e¢ ciency 'i, there is a zero-prot expertise cut-o¤  (') for each ability level ',
below which rm ' will not make product i. This cut-o¤ is dened by di (';  (')) = 0. Since
' and i are independent draws, higher-ability rms will have a lower threshold 

'
 

and
o¤er more products.
Turning to trade, rms will only enter a given destination-product market if they expect to
earn positive prots there. Given that ji

'i
+

, a rm with ability ' will export product i
to country j if its expertise draw i is no lower than a zero-prot cut-o¤ j (') determined by
ji
 
'; j (')

= 0. Following the same logic as before, j

'
 

and abler rms will sell a bigger
number of products nj

'
+

than less able rms to any given destination. Prior evidence indicates
that there is selection into exporting such that rms sell only a subset of their domestically-
marketed products to country j. Similarly, only a subset of domestically active rms in a given
product category export abroad. This is consistent with j (') > 
 (') for all j.
Firms will generally adjust their product range across destinations because j (') depends
on market-specic aggregate demand Rj , price index Pj , variable  j and xed fpj trade costs.
However, sellers will observe a strict hierarchy of products that is stable across destinations. In
each market it enters, exporter ' will start with the same core variety and add more goods in
decreasing order of expertise i until it reaches the marginal product that brings zero prots.11
10Cross-product synergies or cannibalization e¤ects would generate respectively centrifugal or centripetal forces
in rmsproduct portfolio. For example, Eckel-Neary (2010) study cross-product cannibalization in consumption
that arises because an increase in the sales of one variety in a rms portfolio reduces demand for its other
varieties. On the production side, there may be synergies in xed costs such as equipment or managerial supervision
across product lines, or, conversely, diseconomies of scope due to capacity constraints or span of control issues in
managerial supervision.
Intuitively, centrifugal (centripetal) forces would lead rms to o¤er more (fewer) products than in our baseline.
They may also introduce additional motives for variable mark-ups. If so, any centrifugal (centripetal) force that
incentivizes rms to widen (narrow) their product scope would also induce them to concentrate sales away from
(towards) their top varieties. Relative to peripheral goods, rmscore products would still generate higher sales,
sell at lower (higher) prices under e¢ ciency (quality) sorting, and receive weakly higher mark-ups.
11Product hierarchies will generally vary among producers because the expertise draws are i.i.d. across rms
and goods. In practice, the product ranking might also vary across countries within a manufacturer if there are
idiosyncractic taste or cost shocks at the rm-destination-product level. Such idiosyncracies would work against
10
The nature of this product ladder is the main dimension along which the behavior of multi-
product rms changes when there is su¢ cient scope for vertical di¤erentiation in production.
Under e¢ ciency sorting (i.e.   0), rms core competences lie in their cheapest varieties.
Sellers therefore expand their product range by adding products in increasing order of marginal
cost and price. Under quality sorting by contrast (i.e.  > 0), a rms best-selling variety is its
most expensive, highest-quality item. Producers now widen their product scope by adding goods
in decreasing order of marginal cost and price.
When rms adjust their product range across markets, they can modify not only their product
mix on the extensive margin, but also the sales distribution across inframarginal products. This
will however depend on the market structure. With CES demand and monopolistic competition,
for example, the ratio of a suppliers expertise in two varieties uniquely determines the ratio of
their sales in a given market, regardless of the suppliers product scope there. This is no longer
the case with variable mark-ups. Consider for instance linear demand with monopolistic compe-
tition or, alternatively, CES demand with Bertrand competition. In both cases, rms respond
to increased market competition by shifting activity towards their core competences along both
the extensive and the intensive margins: They sell fewer varieties by dropping peripheral prod-
ucts, and they also skew the sales distribution across their surviving products towards their top
varieties. In more general demand structures with variable mark-ups, any centripetal force that
incentivizes rms to narrow their product scope will intuitively also induce them to concentrate
sales towards their top varieties. This includes demand structures that allow for cross-product
interdependencies in production or consumption.
We summarize the solution to rmsmaximization problem at the product level in equation
(1) as follows: Within a multi-product rm, core goods will be sold to more markets, earn higher
revenues in each market, and generate higher worldwide sales than peripheral goods. Within the
rms product portfolio, core goods are always the ones produced with most expertise. However,
while they are the cheapest varieties in the absence of quality di¤erentiation, they represent the
most expensive, highest-quality ones in its presence.
2.2.3 Activity across multiple markets
A rm with ability ' will enter destination market j if its expected prots there from all varieties
i with expertise i > j (') exceed the xed headquarters cost of exporting fhj , i.e. if j (') =X
i:i>

j (')
ji ('; i)  fhj  0. Export prots j (') increase with ability because abler rms
sell more products to j and earn higher revenues from each product, compared to competitors
with the same expertise draws but lower ability. Thus only rms with ability above a cut-o¤
level 'j will service destination j, where '

j satises j

'j

= 0.
With asymmetric countries, 'j varies across destinations and abler rms enter more markets
because they are above the export threshold for more countries. Abler exporters thus outperform
us nding empirical support for our theoretical propositions.
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less able producers along all three export margins: number of export destinations, product range
in each destination, and sales in each destination-product market.
Finally, not all rms that incur the sunk cost of entry survive. Once they observe their ability
and expertise draws, rms begin production only if their expected prots from all domestic and
foreign operations are non-negative, i.e.  (') =
X
j
j (')  fh  0, where fh is the rm-level
xed cost of headquarter services. Total prots increase in ' because abler rms manufacture
and sell more products domestically, earn higher domestic revenues for each product, and have
superior export performance as described above. Companies below a minimum ability level '
are therefore unable to break even and exit immediately upon learning their attributes. This
cut-o¤ is dened by the zero-prot condition  (') = 0.
3 Empirical Predictions
Section 2 delivers a number of testable predictions that make it possible to empirically distin-
guish between models of multi-product rms with and without quality di¤erentiation, as well as
between models with constant and with variable mark-ups. We now summarize these predictions.
3.1 Variation across rms within a product
Within a given product category, the correlation between price and revenue across rms depends
on the extent of quality di¤erentiation. This is a central result in the prior literature and not
novel to our framework, but we restate it here for completeness.
Proposition 1 Across rms within a destination-product market, export prices and export rev-
enues are positively correlated under quality sorting ( > 0), but negatively correlated under
e¢ ciency sorting (  0).
3.2 Variation across products within a rm
In the absence of vertical di¤erentiation across products, rmscore products have low marginal
costs and prices. By contrast, when there is scope for quality upgrading, rms best-selling
varieties are associated with superior quality, higher marginal costs, and higher prices.
Proposition 2 Across products within a rm and across products within a rm-destination,
export prices and export revenues are positively correlated under quality sorting ( > 0), but
negatively correlated under e¢ ciency sorting (  0).
3.3 Variation across destinations within a rm
Product scope and product hierarchies
Multi-product rms observe a product hierarchy. Firms focus on their core competences
and drop their peripheral goods in destinations where they sell fewer products. With constant
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mark-ups, this has clear implications for a rms average price pj (') across the products it o¤ers
in market j. Under quality sorting, exporters add varieties in decreasing order of marginal cost
and quality. Firm ' will thus o¤er lower average quality at a lower average price in countries
where it exports more products. Under e¢ ciency sorting by contrast, product scope nj (') and
pj (') are instead positively correlated across destinations within rms, because exporters add
products in increasing order of marginal cost.
The relationship between rmsproduct range and average price is more nuanced in envi-
ronments with variable mark-ups. It is still the case that rms o¤er more cheaper (expensive)
varieties when they expand their product scope under quality (e¢ ciency) sorting. At the same
time, sellers might also charge higher mark-ups depending on the market structure. In the case
of linear demand and monopolistic competition, for example, rms export more products to mar-
kets where they face less competition and where they can therefore set higher mark-ups. Under
e¢ ciency sorting, variable mark-ups can thus amplify the positive correlation between product
scope and pj (') across destinations within a rm. Under quality sorting, by contrast, variable
mark-ups can make this correlation less negative and possibly even positive.
Note that across markets within a rm, the correlation between the number of exported
products nj (') and the simple average product price pj (') is driven by the extensive margin
of product selection. The corresponding correlation between nj (') and the revenue-weighted
average product price epj (') reects both product selection and the relative sales of di¤erent
products in the rms portfolio. Since core varieties generate higher sales, epj (') > pj (') under
quality sorting and epj (') < pj (') under e¢ ciency sorting. This implies that the correlation
between nj (') and epj (') is smaller than the correlation between nj (') and pj (') in absolute
terms, and its precise sign is theoretically ambiguous.
Proposition 3 Firms observe a product hierarchy. They expand product scope by adding more
peripheral products of lower price under quality sorting ( > 0), and by adding more peripheral
products of higher price under e¢ ciency sorting (  0). Across destinations within a rm,
product scope and the simple average product price are positively correlated under e¢ ciency
sorting; either negatively or positively correlated under quality sorting; and less correlated than
product scope and the revenue-weighted average product price.
Product scope and sales distribution
All else constant, rms earn higher revenues in destinations where they export more goods.
Depending on the market structure, the distribution of sales across products may or may not
change with the number of varieties sold. These relationships hold regardless of the presence and
scope for quality di¤erentiation in production.
Proposition 4 Across destinations within a rm, export product scope and export revenues
are positively correlated. Across destinations within a rm, the distribution of revenues across
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products is independent of product scope under constant mark-ups, but its skewness towards the
rms core products decreases with product scope under variable mark-ups.
4 Data
Our analysis exploits proprietary data from the Chinese Customs O¢ ce on the universe of Chinese
rms that participated in international trade over the 2002-2006 period.12 These data report
the free-on-board value of all export and import trnsactions in U.S. dollars by rm, product and
trade partner for 239 destination/source countries and 8,908 di¤erent products in the 8-digit
Harmonized System.13 They also record the quantities traded in one of 12 di¤erent units of
measurement (such as kilograms, square meters, etc.), which makes it possible to construct unit
values. Trade volumes for each HS-8 digit product category are consistently documented in a
unique unit of measurement.
In principle, unit values should precisely reect producer prices. Since trade datasets rarely
contain direct information on prices, the prior literature has typically relied on unit values as we
do. The level of detail in our data is an important advantage as the unit prices we observe are
not polluted by aggregation across rms or across markets and products within rms. We have
conrmed that all of our results are robust to excluding potential outliers with price levels below
the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile.
While we observe all trade transactions at the monthly frequency, we work with annualized
exports for two reasons. First, there is a lot of seasonality and lumpiness in the monthly data,
and most companies do not sell the same product to a given market in every month. By focusing
on annual data, we avoid this issue and related concerns with sticky prices. Second, outliers are
likely to be of greater concern in the monthly data.
Some state-owned enterprises in China are pure export-import businesses that do not engage
in manufacturing but act exclusively as intermediaries between domestic producers (buyers)
and foreign buyers (suppliers). Following standard practice in the literature, we identify such
wholesalers using keywords in rms names and exclude them from our sample.14 We do so
in order to focus on the operations of companies that both make and trade goods since we are
interested in how production e¢ ciency and product quality a¤ect export activity. Showing direct
evidence on the prices rms pay for imported inputs is thus an important part of our analysis as
they proxy input quality. We cannot apply this approach to intermediaries because we do not
observe their suppliers and cannot interpret their import transactions as input purchases.
12Manova-Zhang (2008) describe these data and provide an overview of Chinese trade patterns. While the raw
data covers the 2000-2006 period, the HS 8-digit product classication changed in 2002. Given our interest in the
operations of multi-product rms, we focus on the 2002-2006 period for which products are consistently coded.
13Product classication is consistent across countries at the 6-digit HS level. The number of distinct product
codes in the Chinese 8-digit HS classication is comparable to that in the 10-digit HS trade data for the U.S.
14We drop 23,073 wholesalers who mediate a quarter of Chinas trade. Using the same data, Ahn et al. (2011)
identify intermediaries in the same way in order to study wholesale activity.
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We study the variation in the scope for quality di¤erentiation across products using three
relatively standard proxies in the literature. These measures are meant to capture technological
characteristics of the manufacturing process that are exogenous from the perspective of an indi-
vidual rm. The rst indicator is the Rauch (1999) dummy for di¤erentiated goods that are not
traded on an organized exchange or listed in reference manuals. It is available for SITC 4-digit
categories, which we concord to the Chinese HS 8-digit classication. We also employ continu-
ous measures of R&D intensity or combined advertising and R&D intensity from Klingebiel et
al (2007) and Kugler-Verhoogen (2008), respectively. These are based on U.S. data for 3-digit
ISIC sectors, which we match to the HS-8 products in our data.
4.1 Comparing prices across products
Our empirical strategy critically rests on the comparison of prices across a rms product range.
Conceptually, we are interested in how quality di¤ers across products, where quality is inter-
preted as the utility consumers derive from a single physical unit of a product. This poses an
obvious challenge: Given both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation across products, we cannot
characterize the quality of di¤erent goods in a rms production portfolio in absolute terms. We
can, however, rate them in relative terms based on how they compare to the average variety
available on the market in their respective product category.
As an illustrative example, consider a rm that sells both printers and cell phones. Let its
printer be qp times better than the average printer on the market and its cell phone be qc times
better than the average cell phone on the market, where qp > qc. Through the lens of our model,
we would ascribe qp and qc as the quality levels of the rms printer and cell phone, respectively.
We would moreover expect that the rms core competence is in manufacturing printers, while
cell phones are its peripheral good.
We implement this approach by demeaning every export (import) unit value by the average
observed across all rms exporting (importing) that HS 8-digit product category. For example,
if rm f charges log pricefp for HS 8-digit product p, and the average log export price across all
Chinese rms selling p is log pricep, then we use log pricefp   log pricep as a standardized price
that we can compare across fs di¤erent HS 8-digit products. When we examine fs operations
in a particular destination d, we are careful to demean its export prices by the relevant averages
across Chinese exporters to that specic market. In other words, if f ships products p and p0 to
country d, we will compare log pricefpd   log pricepd to log pricefp0d   log pricep0d. Our results
for bilateral exports are however not sensitive to this choice of demeaning, and also obtain if we
subtract the global log pricep and log pricep0 averages instead.
Working with log prices instead of prices is motivated by two reasons. First, it is what theory
calls for, given that we will estimate model-based equations in their log-linear form with Ordinary
Least Squares. Second, by demeaning log prices we obtain the distance between a rms price
from the market average in percentage terms rather than in absolute levels. This facilitates the
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comparison of prices across products by accounting for di¤erences across product categories in
both the rst and the second moments of the price distribution.
4.2 A rst glance at the data
Table 1 illustrates the substantial variation in export prices across the 176,116 Chinese manufac-
turers, 7,481 export products, and 239 destination countries in the unbalanced 2002-2006 panel.
Consider rst the average price of each rm-product-year triplet, constructed as the ratio of
annual worldwide sales and quantities across all destinations served d, pricefpt =
P
d revenuefpdtP
d quantityfpdt
.
After removing product-year pair xed e¤ects, the mean log price in the data is 0.00 (by construc-
tion), with a standard deviation of 1.32 across goods and manufacturers. There is comparable
dispersion at the rm-product-destination-year level, with an average log price of 0.00 (by con-
struction) and standard deviation of 1.24.
Prices vary considerably across Chinese producers selling the same HS 8-digit product, to the
same country, in a given year: The standard deviation of rm prices in the average destination-
product-year market is 0.89. This highlights the extent of rm heterogeneity in the data.
There is also a lot of variation in unit values across products within rms. The standard
deviation of demeaned log prices across goods within a rm-year is 0.84 on average when we
consider worldwide exports. This number remains high at 0.75 when we instead look at the
spread of bilateral export prices across products for the average rm-destination-year triplet.
This demonstrates the heterogeneity in product attributes across an exporters merchandise.
Table 2 indicates that the variation in unit values across products within multi-product rms
is not random: Export prices and revenues are in fact systematically positively correlated across
a manufacturers product range. For each year in our sample, we rank each rms products twice,
once based on their worldwide sales and once based on their export price. The best selling or
most expensive good is ranked rst, the second most receives second rank, etc. We thus obtain
every rms global product ranking by sales and by price.
Table 2 shows that rmstop-selling varieties tend to be their most expensive ones. Each
cell in the table reports what fraction of all rm-product pairs receive a certain rank by price
(rows) and sales (columns), averaging across years in the panel. A rms leading product by
export revenues is often also its most or second-most expensive product (45%=5.47/12.19 and
19%=2.27/12.19 of the time, respectively). Similarly, a rms most expensive product is usually
ranked rst or second by export revenues (45% and 18% of the time, respectively). Moreover, the
entries along the diagonal contain the biggest fraction of rm-product pairs in any row or column.
In other words, across all products in a rms output basket, the price rank of a given product is
most likely to exactly coincide with its sales rank. We view these patterns as suggestive of quality
di¤erentiation across products within a rm. In particular, exporterscore expertise appears to
lie in expensive, high-quality goods that generate the most revenues, whereas peripheral products
are cheap, of low quality and contributing little to sales.
16
Appendix Table 2 provides additional summary statistics for the variation in export revenues
across rms, destinations, products and years, as well as in export quality which we infer from
the data on export prices and quantities as described below.
5 Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In Section 5.1, we rst revisit evidence in the
prior literature that constitutes a starting point for our analysis and informs Proposition 1. We
document a positive correlation between export prices and revenues across manufacturers of the
same product category, which we interpret as consistent with quality di¤erentiation across rms.
We next turn to our novel contribution, and examine the variation in market activity across
products within rms. In Section 5.2, we test the central predictions of Proposition 2. We
establish several empirical results which together suggest that multi-product rms use inputs of
di¤erent quality levels in order to produce goods of di¤erent quality levels. Moreover, a rms
core competence is determined by product quality, such that its higher-quality goods command
higher prices and generate higher revenues. In Section 5.3, we then study the relationship between
product scope, export revenues, average price, and sales skewness across destinations within a
rm, as per Propositions 3 and 4. Our ndings indicate that rms concentrate activity towards
their core, high-quality goods in markets where they o¤er fewer products and earn lower export
revenues. This occurs through adjustments both on the extensive margin of product scope and
on the intensive margin of product sales.
Our baseline analysis considers the cross-sectional variation in export activity across rms
and products in the 2002-2006 panel. This allows us to directly project theoretical predictions
onto the data. In Section 5.4, we provide additional corroborative evidence based on multi-
product rms export dynamics. This time-series evidence is consistent with rms expected
response to changes in the econonomic environment within our conceptual framework, and helps
validate the economic mechanisms of interest.
5.1 Variation across rms within a product
Past work has documented that export prices and revenues are positively correlated across rms
within narrow segments of the global economy, such as nely disaggregated product categories
or country-product markets. In light of Proposition 1, this is indicative of quality di¤erentiation
across rms, with more successful exporters o¤ering better-quality goods at higher prices.
Appendix Table 3 conrms that these patterns hold in our data as well. In the spririt of
Manova-Zhang (2012) who study the cross-section of Chinas trade transactions in 2005, we
regress log export unit values on log export revenues by rm, product, destination, and year.
Controlling for destination-product-year triple xed e¤ects, we nd a positive and signicant
coe¢ cient. The point estimates suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in export revenues
is accompanied by 20% higher free-on-board export prices. This association is moreover stronger
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for products with arguably greater scope for quality di¤erentiation, such as di¤erentiated goods
and sectors intensive in R&D and advertising. Column 6 shows that a theoretically-motivated
proxy for product quality is likewise positively correlated with export revenues across rms in a
given market; we describe this proxy in more detail below.
5.2 Variation across products within a rm
5.2.1 Export prices and export revenues
We now turn to the variation in export activity across products within multi-product rms as
informed by Proposition 2. We rst consider the relationship between exportersglobal sales and
prices by product. For each year, we aggregate the data to the rm-product level by summing
trade revenues and quantities across markets. We then take their ratio and construct rm fs
average export price for product p across all destinations d it serves in year t as pricefpt =P
d revenuefpdtP
d quantityfpdt
. In order to make these prices comparable across goods, we demean them by their
product-year specic average across rms. For notational simplicity, ln pricefpt below always
refers to these demeaned log prices.
We estimate the following specication:
ln pricefpt = +  ln revenuefpt + ft + "fpt, (2)
where revenuefpt =
P
d revenuefpdt. As per our model, we include rm-year xed e¤ects ft to
account for systematic di¤erences in ability across exporters, as well as for changes in this ability
level within rms over time. These xed e¤ects also control for all observed and unobserved rm
characteristics outside our model that a¤ect trade outcomes symmetrically across the product
range, such as productivity, managerial competence, xed capital equipment, worker skill, dis-
tribution networks, or experience in foreign markets. At this level of aggregation, the sample
comprises 4,127,779 observations spanning 175,949 rms and 7,477 products. We cluster errors
by rm throughout the paper, to allow for correlated shocks within rms over time.15 Our results
are robust to alternative treatments of the error term, such as clustering by product, by both
rm and product, or by destination (where relevant).
We are primarily interested in , which reects the sign of the conditional correlation between
export price and revenues across goods within a rm. The sign of this correlation allows us to
evaluate the importance of product quality for the operations of multi-product exporters. In
particular,  > 0 would be consistent with quality sorting and  > 0 in the model, while  < 0
would correspond to e¢ ciency sorting and  < 0. We emphasize that we cannot and do not want
15This is motivated by the likely structure of the error term. The ft account for supply and demand shocks
that might be correlated across products within a rm at a given point in time, while demeaning the left-hand side
variable by product-year accommodates possible correlated shocks across rms exporting the same product in the
same year. Clustering by rm addresses the potential additional correlation in supply and demand shocks within
rms over time. For example, rms with more e¤ective management might be less a¤ected by negative aggregate
shocks than rms with weaker management subject to the same shocks.
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to give  a causal interpretation, since unit values and sales are joint outcomes of producers
prot maximization and are both determined by rm ability and product expertise.
The results in Table 3 lend strong support to quality di¤erentiation across a rms products.
Within rms, more expensive goods generate systematically higher global sales. The estimates
in Column 1 imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in exports is associated with 10.6%
higher prices. Column 2 conrms that this result is unrelated to the variation in a companys
market power across products, which could inuence its pricing strategy for reasons outside our
model. For instance, strategic interactions among rms could lead them to charge variable mark-
ups that depend on their market presence relative to competitors. For each product p and year t,
we proxy rm fs market power with its share of total Chinese exports of p, revenuefptP
f revenuefpt
, where
the sum in the denominator is taken over all rms exporting p.
We conduct two further sensitivity analyses to ensure that our ndings are not driven by
measurement error (ME) in export values or quantities that could bias .16 First, we explore the
variation in the scope for quality di¤erentiation across products using three common measures
for  in the model. In Column 3, we regress export prices on export revenues, the Rauch (1999)
indicator for di¤erentiated goods, and the interaction of the two. The rational for this di¤-
in-di¤ approach is that while ME might be present, it arguably does not vary systematically
across industries. ME is thus more likely to a¤ect  than the coe¢ cient on the interaction
term. Indeed, the positive correlation between export prices and revenues is 73% higher for
di¤erentiated products. Similar results obtain in Columns 4 and 5 when we instead proxy  with
sectorsR&D intensity or combined advertising and R&D intensity. For example, prices increase
5.4 percentage points faster with revenues in an industry with 20% higher R&D intensity. All of
these patterns are highly signicant at 1%-5%.
As a second specication check, we study the rank of rmsexport price and revenues instead
of their level. This allows us to rely much less directly on the construction of unit prices. We
order each manufacturers products based on its worldwide sales, such that the top-selling good
is ranked rst, the second-most receives rank 2, etc. We also array rms products by their
demeaned unit values. We allow for changes in rmsproduct hierarchy over time by calculating
these rankings separately for each year. As Column 6 illustrates, there is a strong positive
correlation between productsglobal rank by price and by revenue across goods within exporters.
In unreported regressions, we have conrmed that this correlation increases with sectorsscope
for quality di¤erentiation. These results reinforce our conclusion that  > 0 is not driven by ME
bias, since such bias would have to be severe to systematically distort product rankings.
We next perform a more stringent test of the model and examine the variation across ex-
portersgoods within specic destination markets. We estimate an expanded version of equation
16See Manova-Zhang (2012) for a discussion of why the direction of such bias is ex-ante ambiguous and depends
on the nature of ME in revenues and/or quantities. They also show that the correlation of price and revenue is
not mechanically positive by construction.
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(2) with the rm-product-country-year quadruplet as the unit of observation:
ln pricefpdt = +  ln revenuefpdt + fdt + "fpdt. (3)
Here ln pricefpdt is rm fs log price for product p in destination d in year t, after it has been
demeaned by the product-country-year specic average price. Similarly, bilateral instead of
global trade values enter on the right-hand side. We include rm-destination-year triple xed
e¤ects fdt, which implicitly account for the variation in total expenditure, trade costs, consumer
price indices, and market toughness across countries as directed by theory. The fdt dummies
additionally control for cross-country di¤erences in consumer preferences and other institutional
frictions that are outside our model, as well as for rmsmarket-specic distribution networks
and export experience. For simplicity, we use the same coe¢ cient notation in all estimating
equations, although the coe¢ cients di¤er conceptually across specications.
As evidenced in Table 4, exporters earn higher revenues from their more expensive products
not only in terms of worldwide sales, but also within each destination. This correlation is not
driven by di¤erences in market power across a rms product lines, which we now proxy with
bilateral market shares revenuefpdtP
f revenuefpdt
. The relationship is also signicantly stronger for goods
with greater scope for quality upgrading. It is furthermore robust to using productsprice and
revenue ranks instead of levels, where these ranks have been constructed separately for each rm,
year, and importing country based on bilateral sales.
Overall, the point estimates in Table 4 and their statistical signicance are very similar to
those for global exports in Table 3. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in bilateral
exports is accompanied by 9.5% higher bilateral unit values. This comovement in export sales and
prices across products within rms amounts to half of the corresponding comovement across rms
within product markets reported in the previous section. This signals the empirical relevance of
the model in rationalizing both patterns in the data.
5.2.2 Inferred export quality and export revenues
The results in Tables 3 and 4 show that rmsbest-selling products are their most expensive
varieties. In our model, this outcome obtains only when there is quality variation across goods
within a rm, and when it is su¢ ciently powerful to dominate the price e¤ects of e¢ ciency hetero-
geneity, i.e.  > 0. It is thus possible that rms actively vary quality across their product range,
but this force is overpowered by the correlated variation in production e¢ ciency across goods.
A separate concern is that theoretical frameworks other than the ones we have considered might
generate a positive relationship between prices and revenues without the quality mechanism.
The systematic patterns that we document across sectors with di¤erent potential for quality
upgrading go a long way towards establishing our quality interpretation. Nevertheless, we would
ideally like to show corroborative evidence using direct measures of product quality. In the
absence of such information, we rst construct an indicator bqfpt for unobserved product quality
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qfpt from observed data on export quantities xfpt and prices pfpt. We proxy quality with ln bqfpt =
 lnxfpt + ln pfpt, where we set the elasticity of substitution across varieties at the commonly
used value  = 5; our results are robust to alternative choices over . This quality proxy can be
structurally motivated in theoretical models that feature CES preferences and constant mark-ups
such as Khandelwal (2008), and it has been used for example in Khandelwal et al (2013) and
Fan et al (2015). We remove product-year xed e¤ects from this calculation to ensure that prices
and quantities are comparable across products.
The results in Column 7 of Table 3 reveal that export revenues are positively correlated with
inferred quality ln bqfpt across products within a rm. In Column 7 of Table 4, we similarly nd a
strong positive correlation between bilateral export revenues and quality across products within
a rm-destination, where we impute market-specic product quality as ln bqfpdt =  lnxfpdt +
ln pfpdt. We obtain substantially higher point estimates than in our baseline price regressions in
Column 1, suggesting that rmscore products feature both high quality and high production
e¢ ciency as manifested in low quality-adjusted prices. A one-standard-deviation rise in bilateral
export revenues is on average attained with 280% higher product quality. While this evidence
is consistent with the quality channel we emphasize, an important caveat is that bqfpt and bqfpdt
would not accurately proxy product quality in theoretical frameworks with variable mark-ups.
5.2.3 Export prices and imported-input prices
To more conclusively establish the quality mechanism, we exploit the rich nature of our data
to obtain measures for the quality of rms inputs in production. A large number of Chinese
exporters use imported inputs (59% of all exporters and 57% of all exporter-year observations),
and the customs les record all such input purchases. While we do not observe manufacturers
use of domestic materials, inputs, and labor, we can therefore use the prices they pay for imported
parts as an indicator for the quality of all of their inputs. A positive correlation between this
indicator and export prices across a rms products would then signal that producers vary the
quality of their outputs by using inputs of di¤erent quality levels.17
Combining information on input and output prices has two additional advantages. From an
economics perspective, input prices in principle capture the objective quality of an input and,
by extension, its resultant output; output prices by contrast reect both products objective
quality and consumerssubjective quality valuation. From an econometrics perspective, input
and output prices are obtained from independent data series, such that their relationship is not
subject to ME concerns that could bias the correlation between output sales and prices.
Operationalizing this methodology poses some challenges. We are interested in exporters that
make multiple products using multiple intermediates. For each rm f and product p at time
t, we would thus like to calculate ln input pricefpt, the average input price across all imported
17 If such a positive correlation instead reected producers passing on cost shocks to consumers for reasons
outside our model, we would have observed a negative correlation between export prices and revenues, as in that
case higher export prices would have implied less e¢ cient production rather than higher quality.
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inputs that f uses to manufacture p. We therefore need to allocate inputs to outputs in order
to develop quality proxies that vary across products within a rm. We pursue two di¤erent
strategies, and nd very similar results that are consistent with quality di¤erentiation.
We rst focus on foreign inputs in the same broad industry classication as the output
product. For example, if a rm buys tyres and steering wheels and sells cars, both its exports
and imports would be recorded in the automobile industry. The average price across the tyres
and wheels that it uses would then proxy the quality of the cars that it makes. If the company
also manufactures cell phones, the price that it pays for SIM cards would enter the measured
quality of its cell phones but not that of its cars.
Recall that we observe trade ows by HS 8-digit product. For every producer f , we construct
a weighted average log input price across all materials that f imports (e.g. tyres, steering wheels)
in a given HS 3-digit category (e.g. vehicles), which we label ln input priceHS3fpt . We use import
values as weights, but our results are robust to taking an unweighted average instead.18 We assign
ln input priceHS3fpt to all HS 8-digit products p that f exports in a given HS 3-digit industry (e.g.
cars and trucks). This allows us to obtain input quality proxies for 25% of the observations at
the rm-export product-year level in our data, for a sample of 1,031,424 observations.
Our second approach to matching rms imported inputs to exported products relies on
detailed input-output tables for China. These tables report the total value of inputs used from
one sector for production in another sector, in a matrix of 139 sectors. The relative contribution
of two inputs varies signicantly across output sectors. For example, manufacturing a car might
require tyres, multiple LED displays and some cloth for upholstery; assembling a cell phone
might demand only one display, no tyres and no cloth; and sewing a dress might need only cloth.
For each rm, we can therefore apply the input-output tables to allocate some part of its
every imported input to each of its exported products. Let uij be the value of input i used in
the production of sector j in the IO tables. Let the set of sectors j exported by rm f be J . We
assume that a share uijX
jJ
uij
of fs total imports of i are employed in manufacturing j. Using
these inferred input values as weights, we construct the weighted average input price for rm fs
output j across its inputs i in year t.19 We refer to this measure as ln input priceIOfpt, and assign
it to all HS-8 digit products that f exports in IO sector j. This generates input quality proxies
for 58% of the observations at the rm-export product-year level in our data, for a sample of
2,403,309 observations.
We believe that parsing out inputs to outputs in this way is informative if imperfect. It
gauges the variation in marginal costs across a rms products in a more comprehensive way
than focusing only on inputs within the same narrow sector as the output, as we did for ln input
priceHS3fpt . At the same time, companies need not necessarily combine intermediates in the same
18Before this manipulation, we demean all import prices by their product-year specic average across rms.
This makes import prices comparable across inputs and parallels our standardization of export prices.
19As before, we use import prices demeaned by their product-specic average import price across rms.
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proportion as in the IO tables. To the extent that individual rms input sourcing strategy
and production process deviate from the aggregate patterns reected in the IO tables, this
would introduce classical measurement error and bias our results downwards. For robustness, in
unreported regressions we have considered a slightly di¤erent formula for ln input priceIOfpt and
reassuringly obtained very similar results.20
We examine the relationship between producersoutput and input prices by estimating:
ln pricefpt = +  ln input pricefpt + ft + "fpt, (4)
where ln pricefpt is rm fs demeaned export price for product p in year t based on worldwide
sales. We measure ln input pricefpt with either ln input priceHS3fpt (Panel A of Table 5) or ln input
priceIOfpt (Panel B); the two deliver point estimates of comparable magnitude and signicance. As
before, we exploit purely the variation across output goods within a manufacturer by including
rm-year pair xed e¤ects ft. We are once again interested in  as a conditional correlation that
does not permit a causal interpretation: The choices of input and output quality are intimately
related in exportersprot maximization problem in a framework with endogenous quality choice.
Consistently with our theoretical predictions for  > 0, we nd a highly statistically and
economically signicant positive association between input and output prices across products
within a rm. Our baseline in Column 1 indicates an elasticity of 0:11 to 0:13. These results
are robust to explicitly controlling for manufacturersmarket power both in the output market
for their export goods and in the input market for their imported parts (Column 2). As earlier,
we capture the former with fs share of total Chinese exports of output product p in year t,
revenuefptP
f revenuefpt
. To measure the latter symmetrically, for each year we average fs share of total
Chinese imports across all of its inputs that are matched to its output product p and used in the
calculation of ln input pricefpt.21
Through the lens of our model, we interpret this as strong evidence that Chinese exporters use
inputs of di¤erent quality levels to produce goods of di¤erent quality levels. To shed more light
on this mechanism, we re-estimate equation (4) separately for homogeneous and di¤erentiated
export products in Columns 3 and 4. Firmsexport prices rise substantially more quickly with
their input prices when the output product is di¤erentiated. This is in line with the models
prediction that output price and quality increase faster with marginal cost and input quality in
sectors with greater scope for quality di¤erentiation (i.e. higher ).
Our results survive two additional sensitivity checks. All Chinese customs transactions are
20 In particular, we constructed the weighted average input price using the ratios uijX
iI
uij
as weights without
exploiting information on rmsimport values. These weights implicitly assume that all rms use di¤erent inputs i
in the same proportion when making a given product j. This is the counterpart to the assumption behind ln input
priceIOfpt that all rms allocate a given input i in the same proportion across di¤erent outputs j.
21 It is not obvious ex ante whether and how market power would enter. Manufacturing more of a certain product
requires bigger input quantities. A bigger export market share might thus allow rms to charge higher mark-ups
and to negotiate lower input prices. This would tend to bias  downwards. On the other hand, input scarcity or
convexity in production costs might bias  upwards.
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recorded as occurring under one of two main trade regimes: processing and ordinary trade.22
Processing rms import inputs specically for further processing, assembly, and re-exporting.
Ordinary exporters may or may not use imported materials when producing for foreign markets.
Since we have removed all trade intermediaries from our sample, we can interpret the import
transactions of both ordinary and processing exporters as purchases of foreign inputs. We have
nevertheless conrmed that all patterns in Table 5 hold when we focus on processing imports
only. Column 5 replicates our baseline regression for this subsample.
We also verify that our results are not driven by potential aggregation bias in the matching
of inputs to outputs. By design, the two algorithms we use can map multiple HS 8-digit export
products to the same imported-input price (at the HS 3-digit or IO-sector level). In Column
6, we collapse the data such that output prices on the left-hand side are at the same level of
aggregation as input prices on the right-hand side. Our results continue to hold, with the point
estimate for  increasing. All ndings in Columns 2-5 also obtain at this level of aggregation.
Finally, Column 7 shows that a strong positive relationship holds not only between input and
output prices, but also between inferred input and output quality across products within a rm.
Following the same methodology as in Section 5.2.2, we back out proxies for the quality of every
imported input at the rm-product-country level from the available information on import prices
and quantities. For each of a rm fs output products p, we construct ln input qualityHS3fpt and
ln input qualityIOfpt as the weighted average quality of fs imported inputs used in the production
of p, based on the same assignment of inputs to output products as above. In line with our
quality interpretation, we observe  > 0 when we re-estimate equation (4) replacing input and
output price levels with their respective imputed quality.
5.3 Variation across destinations within a rm
The analysis so far has established robust positive correlations between export prices, export
revenues, input prices, and inferred quality across a manufacturers product range. As per
Proposition 2, these results are consistent with quality di¤erentiation across products within
multi-product rms, whereby exporters earn higher revenues from their core expensive goods
that are of superior quality.
We next examine how exporters adjust their product scope and sales distribution across
destinations. Our interest here is not in the underlying di¤erences across markets that trigger
such adjustments, but rather in the attributes of the goods that rms choose to o¤er and to sell
more of when they adjust their product range. This analysis is guided by Propositions 3 and 4.
5.3.1 Product scope and product hierarchies
We rst study how rms vary their export activity across destination countries along the extensive
marginf product entry. Specically, we assess the extent to which exporters observe a product
22See Manova-Yu (2016) among others for more details on these regimes.
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hierarchy by introducing their core products in all markets and progressively adding goods that
they have less expertise in when they enlarge the set of products on o¤er. We also study how
average prices and average inferred quality change with the number of traded products, to gauge
to what extent rmsproduct hierarchy is determined by e¢ ciency vs. quality sorting.
We begin with the joint variation in product scope, average price and export revenues across
destinations within a company. For each rm f , country d and year t, we obtain total bilateral ex-
ports, revenuefdt =
P
p revenuefpdt, and record the number of products shipped, Nproductsfdt.
We construct the simple average log price across the products that f sells to d at time t, after
these prices have been demeaned by their product-destination-year average. We likewise compute
the weighted average of these demeaned prices, using rmsbilateral exports as weights.
We evaluate the implications of Propositions 3 and 4 for the extensive margin of multi-product
rmsexports by estimating:
ln revenuefdt = +  lnNproductsfdt + ft + "fdt and (5)
ln avg pricefdt = +  lnNproductsfdt + ft + "fdt.
Given the rm-year pair xed e¤ects ft in these regressions,  is identied purely from the
cross-sectional variation across countries within manufacturers. As before, it reects conditional
correlations of interest and does not support a causal interpretation: In the model, product
scope, export revenues and average prices are jointly pinned down by a producers ability draw
and characteristics of the destination market.
In line with our theoretical predictions, exporters earn systematically higher revenues in coun-
tries where they sell more products (Column 1 of Table 6). At the same time, product scope
is negatively correlated with the average price across products (Column 2). This pattern is not
driven by cross-country di¤erences in a rms market power, as proxied by the average market
share across its products in a destination-year (Column 3). Moreover, it holds in the sample
of di¤erentiated goods with potential for quality upgrading, but is absent among homogeneous
commodities (Columns 4 and 5). Finally, the theoretically ambiguous relationship between prod-
uct scope and the revenue-weighted average price is markedly less negative and not statistically
di¤erent from 0 (Column 6).
These relationships are economically signicant. The typical rm generates 85% higher bi-
lateral revenues and lowers its average bilateral f.o.b. price by 1% when it exports 50% more
products to a given destination. The latter correlation is 20% higher for di¤erentiated varieties.
Through the lens of our model, these results suggest that exporters expand (restrict) their
product o¤ering across markets by consistently exporting core expensive varieties of high quality
and adding (dropping) peripheral cheaper goods of inferior quality. In particular, Proposition 3
indicates that a rms number of products and their average price would be negatively associated
only with quality sorting ( > 0), but not with e¢ ciency sorting. This conclusion is further
bolstered by the results in Columns 7-8, where we re-estimate equation (5) for the average inferred
output quality across a rms products, rather than their average price. Moreover, compared to
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the simple average quality, the weighted average quality is not only less negatively correlated,
but it is in fact signicantly positively correlated with product scope across destinations within a
rm-year. In light of Proposition 3, this illustrates the large adjustments that rms make across
markets, both along the extensive margin of product scope and along the intensive margin of
product sales.
While the evidence in Table 6 points to the validity of Propositions 3 and 4 for the case of
quality sorting, it does not directly establish whether rms adhere to the same global product
hierarchy in all destinations. We next present empirical patterns consistent with an important
role for such a hierarchy. While the exact rankings of products by export sales, by price, and by
inferred quality do di¤er to some degree across the multiple markets that a rm serves, the data
suggest that such deviations from a strict product hierarchy are small in magnitude.
We begin with informative summary statistics. For each rm-destination pair, we obtain the
cross-product correlation between the global and the bilateral revenue rank of products in the
rms export portfolio. We record the average and the standard deviation of these correlations
across destinations within each rm. For the median rm, the average correlation is 0.69, with a
standard deviation of 0.30. We then ask how much of the total variation in product ranks across
products and destinations within a rm can be ascribed to xed factors at the rm-product level.
In particular, we regress the bilateral rank of product p exported by rm f to destination d on
rm-product pair xed e¤ects. The R-squared from this regression is very high at 0.85 in the
cross-section for year 2006, and increases further to 0.93 when we control for the number of rms
bilaterally exported products.
We next systematically examine the relationship between the number of products that a rm
sells in a given market and where these products enter in the rms global product ranking.
We rst consider the agnostic ranking of rm fs products based on their global sales, ignoring
the underlying cause for this ranking. For each company and year, the good that generates
the highest revenues worldwide receives rank 1, the second-highest revenues - rank 2, etc. We
record the average, minimum and maximum ranks observed across the products that f sells to
destination d in year t. If the exporter follows a strict product ladder in all countries, then the
minimum global product rank would be 1 in every market. The maximum rank, on the other
hand, would equal the number of products shipped, Nproductsfdt. Thus, product scope would be
uncorrelated with the minimum product rank across destinations within a rm-year, but it would
be positively correlated with the maximum and with the average product rank. Deviations from
these patterns would signal that rms do not maintain a strict product hierarchy, and instead
re-order products across markets. In practice, we work with the 10th and 90th percentiles instead
of the minimum and the maximum ranks to guard against idiosyncratic outliers.23
We evaluate these predictions by regressing each of the three relevant rank measures on the
number of bilaterally traded products in specications at the rm-destination-year level. Firm-
23Qualitatively similar results obtain if we instead use these extreme values.
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year pair xed e¤ects ensure that the conditional correlation  is estimated from the variation
across markets within an exporter at a given point in time:
favg rankfdt;min rankfdt;max rankfdtg = + Nproductsfdt + ft + "fdt. (6)
As Panel A of Table 7 shows, the average sales product rank indeed rises signicantly with
product scope. This pattern is more pronounced among di¤erentiated goods, although it is also
present among homogeneous varieties. Moreover, the 90th percentile rank increases about twice
as fast with the number of goods shipped as the average, whereas the 10th percentile rank is
essentially una¤ected.
We next impose more structure on the origin of product hierarchies in rmsexport portfolios,
and rank products based on their global price (i.e. global sales / global quantities) instead of
their global sales. Now in each year, exportersmost expensive product receives rank 1, their
second-most expensive product - rank 2, etc. We similarly develop a global product ladder for
each rm and year based on inferred product quality.
In Panels B and C of Table 7, we re-estimate equation (6) using exportersglobal price and
quality product rankings. We obtain qualitatively similar results as in Panel A with two excep-
tions. The average rank becomes independent of or very weakly correlated with product scope for
non-di¤erentiated products, which strengthens our conclusions. While the 10th percentile now
falls with Nproductsfdt, the important observation for our purposes is that the 90th percentile
rises faster than that in absolute terms.
Together, Tables 6 and 7 suggest that exporterscore competence lies with their expensive
products, which correspond to their highest-quality goods. In destinations where rms choose
to o¤er fewer varieties, they focus on these high-quality, core products. At the same time,
product hierarchies are not perfectly observed across destinations as per the baseline model.
This is consistent with unobserved supply and demand shocks at the product-destination or
rm-product-destination level, such as variation in transportation costs and in consumer tastes
as in Bernard et al (2010).24
5.3.2 Product scope and sales distribution
We next examine how rms vary their export activity across destination countries along the
intensive margin. We consider the distribution of sales across products within a rm, and assess
if and how product scope relates to the concentration of sales towards core goods. This is
informative because according to Proposition 4, such a systematic relationship would emerge
only in frameworks with variable mark-ups, but not in environments with constant mark-ups
and monopolistic competition.
24For completeness, we have checked that the results for the variation across destinations within rms in Tables
6 and 7 also apply to the variation across rms within a destination-year. We do so by re-estimating the relevant
equations with destination-year instead of rm-year xed e¤ects. This implies that within a market, rms exporting
more products have higher revenues and focus on their core expensive goods. These ndings are consistent with
the model and further corroborate our interpretaion.
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For each rm f , destination d and year t, we measure export sales concentration with
the log ratio of the revenues generated by fs top and second-best product in d at time t,
ln (revenuefdt;1=revenuefdt;2).25 We identify these top two products in three di¤erent ways,
based on bilateral export sales, prices, or inferred qualities. We rely on rmsbilateral trade
activity to account for the fact that they may not observe the same product hierarchy in all
markets. We regress each concentration ratio on the exporters log number of products sold in
destination d and year t. Since we are interested in the variation across importing countries
within a rm, we include rm-year pair xed e¤ects ft:
ln (revenuefdt;1=revenuefdt;2) = +  lnNproductsfdt + ft + "fdt. (7)
As Table 8 shows, rms skew their exports more towards their top-selling, most expensive,
and highest-quality good in markets where they sell fewer varieties (Columns 1, 4, 7). Halving the
product range is associated with a 21% rise in revenues from the best-selling product relative to
the second-best. This number reaches 8.5% when we consider the concentration of sales towards
the most expensive good, and 15.5% when we instead focus on the concentration of sales towards
the highest-quality product. In the rest of Table 7 we estimate equation (7) separately for rms
homogeneous and di¤erentiated products, and document that qualitatively similar results hold
for both categories.26
In unreported regressions, we have conrmed that similar results obtain when we use an
alternative measure of sales concentration: the Herndahl index for the distribution of bilateral
exports across all of fs products sold to destination d. An advantage of this measure is that
it takes into account the complete sales distribution across fs full product range, rather than
the relative sales of the top two products alone. However, it provides a consistency check only
for Column 1, where products are ranked based on sales. It cannot shed light on the attributes
(production e¢ ciency, product quality) of the products that generate high revenues.
These ndings imply that in tougher markets where rms opt to sell fewer products, they
shift activity towards their core, high-quality goods both along the extensive margin (by dropping
lower-quality varieties) and along the intensive margin (by concentrating sales further towards
high-quality products). In light of Proposition 4, these patterns are inconsistent with the constant
mark-ups implied by the combination of CES demand and monopolistic competition. Instead,
they suggest that variable mark-ups importantly a¤ect the sales decisions of multi-product rms,
where such variable mark-ups may arise from deviations from CES demand, monopolistic com-
petition, and/or cross-product independence in production or consumption.
25As Melitz et al (2014), we use the log ratio in order to capture the relative contribution of di¤erent products
in percentage terms.
26Of note, the concentration of sales towards expensive and towards high-quality products falls faster with
product scope for di¤erentiated varieties than for homogeneous goods. On the other hand, the opposite is true of
the concentration of sales towards the best-selling product.
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5.4 Export dynamics within rms over time
The analysis so far has examined the cross-sectional variation in export activity across rms,
products, and destinations. This elucidates how rms make decisions about their optimal product
scope and revenues in each consumer market, given the prevailing market conditions at a certain
point in time. It also informs how rms determine the level and cross-sectional distribution of
product quality, prices, and sales across country-product markets.
In this section, we provide complementary evidence on how multi-product, multi-quality rms
adjust their export activity in response to changes in economic conditions over time. In particular,
we examine the pattern of reallocation across products within rms along the extensive margin
of product entry and exit, as well as along the intensive margin of changes in sales levels and
concentration among surviving products.
The static conceptual framework in Section 2 can be generalized to accommodate exogenous
supply and demand shocks. Consider rst shocks that a¤ect all products symmetrically, such
as aggregate expenditure growth in a given destination which raises demand proportionately for
all varieties. Propositions 3 and 4 would have clear predictions for exportersoptimal response:
Conditional on expanding export activity and sales, rms will enlarge their export product
scope by going down their product ladder and adding more of their peripheral goods. Compared
to surviving varieties, these newly introduced products will generate lower revenues and sell
at higher (lower) prices under e¢ ciency (quality) sorting. In addition, rms will preserve the
concentration of sales among inframarginal varieties in the case of constant mark-ups, but reduce
it under variable mark-ups. Conversely, negative shocks would induce rms to contract total
export sales by narrowing their product range, dropping marginal varieties that occupy the
bottom of the product hierarchy, and possibly skewing sales further towards the top inframarginal
products that survive.
Consider next supply and demand shocks that di¤erentially a¤ect products, such as exogenous
shifts in product-specic input costs or consumer tastes. Such shocks would reorder the ranking
of products by protability in a rms output portfolio. As a result, should rms optimally choose
to increase total exports (for example because of a large positive shock across the board), they
might introduce new varieties that generate higher sales and rank higher in terms of e¢ ciency or
quality than incumbent products in their export basket. Moreover, rms might simultaneously
add and drop products. While the predictions of Proposition 4 regarding product scope and sales
concentration would still hold, the implications of Proposition 3 regarding product hiearchies
would remain qualitatively valid but quantitatively less relevant.
The analysis of rmsexport dynamics thus serves several purposes. First, it allows us to
assess how important the allocation of activity across products is to the operations of multi-
product rms, not only in the cross-section but also for export dynamics.
Second, export dynamics reveal to what extent rmsproduct hierarchy is stable over time and
governed by the same factors as in the cross-section. As discussed above, product-specic shocks
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can reshu­ e productsrelative protability. Firms may also actively upgrade their production
technology to improve e¢ ciency and/or quality, but the associated costs and returns may vary
across products. Either force could lead to product hierarchies changing signicantly within
rms over time. Moreover, quality sorting might characterize the pattern of export activity in
the cross section in line with our results above, but reallocations across products over time might
be determined by di¤erential adjustments in production e¢ ciency.
Finally, panel analysis can inform how multi-product companies respond to trade reforms that
a¤ect export opportunities. We can document how product characteristics prior to exogenous
policy shocks shape export behavior following reforms. In addition to being policy-relevant, this
exercise allows us to overcome outstanding concerns with endogeneity or omitted variable bias.
We perform our analysis in two di¤erent ways. We rst study the export dynamics of all rms
surviving from the beginning to the end of our panel, and consider the change in their trade
behavior from 2002 to 2006. We can thus agnostically identify the roles of production e¢ ciency
and product quality in guiding adjustments across products in the medium run, without taking
a stance on why rms choose to adjust export activity in the rst place.
We then exploit the removal of export quotas under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) in
2005, and explore the export dynamics of surviving rms in the textiles and apparel industry
in the short run from 2004 to 2006. We focus on the HS 6-digit product categories that are
considered a¤ected by the reform because they faced binding quotas (i.e. exports prior to the
reform exceeded 90% of the quota level) and on the export destinations for which these quotas
applied (US and all EU countries). Although this reform impacted only 8.7% of the rm popu-
lation in 2004, exploring its e¤ects has two benets compared to the full-panel analysis. First,
it constituted a large, exogenous shock to foreign demand from the perspective of individual
producers, and indeed triggered rapid growth in aggregate exports of textiles and apparel. The
MFA episode thus identies a precise rather than agnostic reason for exporters to expand trade
activity, and it has been exploited as an exogenous shock for identication purposes in several
studies (c.f. Khandelwal et al 2013, Manova-Yu 2016). Second, focusing on the textiles and
apparel industries serves as a case study of manufacturers that operate in a well-dened product
space and use relatively transparent production technologies.27
5.4.1 Adjustment across products within rms
We rst evaluate how exporters reallocate activity across products by dropping some varieties
from their export portfolio, introducing new ones, and adjusting the sales of surviving goods.
27See Upward-Wang (2016) for complementary evidence that the MFA reform induced rms to expand their
product scope. We study instead the di¤erential adjustments that rms made across their product range.
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We estimate the following three specications at the rm-product level:
Dropfp;t=1 = + Product Attributefp;t=0 + f + "fp, (8a)
Addfp;t=1 = + Product Attributefp;t=1 + f + "fp, (8b)
 ln revenuefp = + Product Attributefp;t=0 + f + "fp. (8c)
In equation (8a), the sample comprises all products p that rm f exports at time t = 0,
and the outcome variable Dropfp;t=1 is an indicator set to 1 if the rm does not export p at
time t = 1. In (8b), the sample comprises all products p that f exports at time t = 1, and
the outcome variable Addfp;t=1 is an indicator set to 1 if the rm did not export p at time
t = 0. In (8c), the sample comprises all surviving products p that f exports at both t = 0
and t = 1, and the outcome variable is the change in log export revenues from t = 0 to t = 1,
 ln revenuefp = ln revenuefp;t=1   ln revenuefp;t=0. The explanatory variables of interest,
Product Attributefp;t=0 and Product Attributefp;t=1, refer to the log export revenue, price, or
quality of a rms product at time t = 0 and t = 1 respectively. We include rm xed e¤ects,
such that  is estimated from the variation in export dynamics across varieties within a rm.
The results in Table 9 reveal patterns strongly consistent with the implications of Proposition
3 for the evolution of multi-product rmsexports over time. In Panel A, we study the balanced
panel of surviving rms in our data, such that t0 and t1 correspond to years 2002 and 2006. We
nd that exporters are more likely to discontinue products that generate lower revenues, that
sell at lower prices, and that feature lower quality (Columns 1-3). In the quality-sorting version
of our conceptual framework, these are precisely the goods that would be classed as peripheral
and most prone to being cut when rms scale down operations. Likewise, the new varieties that
exporters introduce tend to have lower sales and quality than incumbent products, but they
do attain slightly higher prices (Columns 4-6). This is consistent with rms expanding their
product range by going further down their product ladder, if there is both quality and e¢ ciency
di¤erentiation across varieties and prices reect their net e¤ect on marginal costs.
These adjustments on the extensive margin of product scope are accompanied by reallocations
on the intensive margin of sales levels for inframarginal products: Goods that initially rank higher
on the product hierarchy in terms of sales, price, or quality experience less revenue growth over
time (Columns 7-9). In light of Proposition 4, this is in line with companies concentrating their
exports less in core varieties when they expand their product range. Having said that, these
ndings are also consistent with product-scpecic shocks that re-order the product hierarchy
and generate mean reversion in product-level exports. The analysis in the next subsection,
however, provides more direct evidence in support of the former interpretation.
We obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results when we turn to the MFA reform in
Panel B. We now restrict the sample to rms in the textiles and apparel industries that enjoyed
a large exogenous increase in foreign demand in 2005, and set t0 and t1 to years 2004 and 2006,
respectively. In response to this policy shock, exporters systematically added (and occasionally
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dropped) products that rank lower on their product hierarchy as reected in export sales, prices
and quality, while also attening the distribution of sales across their product range. Of note,
the coe¢ cient on initial product price turns from positive to negative and insignicant, lending
further support to quality sorting.
As a robustness check, in Appendix Table 4 we replicate this analysis using ordinal ranks
instead of continuous measures for the product attributes of interest (sales, price, quality). We
observe the same, highly signicant patterns. (Note that as expected,  ips sign since a core
product with high attribute values receives a lower rank number by construction.) We further
establish that rms not only tend to add/drop products from the lower end of their product
hierarchy, but they also generally preserve the ranking of inframarginal products in their export
basket: There is a strong positive correlation between the initial and end ranks of surviving
varieties. This correlation is strongest when we rank products by sales (48.8%, 61.1%), but
remains high when we rank them by quality (40.8%, 45.6%) or price (32.4%, 35.4%).
5.4.2 Adjustment across destinations within rms
We next assess how rms adjust their export activity di¤erentially across destination markets.
Changes in aggregate economic conditions that a¤ect all products in an exporters output port-
folio are not perfectly correlated across countries. Similarly, product-level supply and demand
shocks can be destination-specic. We can thus exploit the variation across countries to further
evaluate the empirical relevance of Propositions 3 and 4 for export dynamics. We estimate the
following three specications:
 ln revenuefd = +  lnNproductsfd + f + "fd, (9a)
 ln (revenuefd;1=revenuefd;2) = +  lnNproductsfd + f + "fd, (9b)
avg rankfd = + Nproductsfd + f + "fd. (9c)
The unit of observation in these specications is now the rm-destination pair, and the sample
comprises all destination markets d that rm f serves at both t = 0 and t = 1. The explanatory
variable of interest is the change in the (log) number of products that f exports to d from t = 0
to t = 1. We include rm xed e¤ects to identify  from the variation in export patterns across
countries within a rm. We report our ndings for the 2002-2006 long di¤erence in the full panel
in Panel A of Table 10, and for the 2004-2006 short-term response to the MFA reform in Panel
B of Table 10.
Equations (9a) and (9b) speak to the validity of Proposition 4. In (9a), the outcome vari-
able is the change in rm fs log exports to destination d,  ln revenuefd = ln revenuefd;t=1  
ln revenuefd;t=0. As Column 1 indicates, expanding their product scope in a given market indeed
allows rms to generate higher sales there. In (9b), the outcome variable is the change in sales con-
centration in fs core products, ln (revenuefd;1=revenuefd;2) = ln (revenuefd1;t=1=revenuefd2;t=1) 
ln (revenuefd1;t=0=revenuefd2;t=0). As in Table 8, we measure sales concentration with the log
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ratio of exports of the top and second-best product, where these two products are ranked based
on bilateral export sales, prices, and inferred qualities. Columns 2-4 show that widening the
product range is accompanied by attening the sales distribution across products, as indirectly
implied by the evidence for product-level sales in Table 9.
Finally, equation (9c) provides further support for Proposition 3. The outcome variable is
now the change in the average global rank across the products that rm f sells in country d,
avg rankfd = avg rankfd;t=1   avg rankfd;t=0. As in Table 7, for each year t = 0 and t = 1,
we rst rank fs products globally based on their worldwide sales, price, and inferred quality.
We then take the average of these global ranks across the varieties exported bilaterally to d. If
rms observe the same global product hierarchy in all markets at a given point in time, then
avg rankfd will increase with Nproductsfd, even if this global product hierarchy changes over
time because of aggregate or product-level shocks that are not destination-specic. This is in
fact what we nd in Columns 5-7. By contrast, if rms experienced destination-product specic
shocks that dominated any aggregate or product-level shocks, they would di¤erentially adjust
their product hierarchy across countries and avg rankfd would be unrelated to Nproductsfd.
Through the lens of our conceptual framework, the combined evidence in Tables 9 and 10 there-
fore indicates that rm-product level characteristics (production e¢ ciency, product quality) are
powerful enough to generate stable product hieararchies within multi-product rms, both in the
cross-section of countries and in the time-series within countries.
6 Conclusion
This paper establishes that product hierarchies and quality di¤erentiation govern the operations
of multi-product rms. We present a general conceptual framework in which manufacturers draw
di¤erent production e¢ ciencies across products and optimally choose the distribution of prices,
quality, and sales across their product range. This framework delivers a set of predictions that
allow us to empirically assess how e¢ ciency and quality sorting interact with the product margin
inside rms.
Using detailed customs data for China, we empirically establish that rms allocate activity
across products in line with strong quality di¤erentiation. Multi-product rms vary output
quality across their products by using inputs of di¤erent quality levels. Their core competence is
in varieties of superior quality that command higher prices but nevertheless generate higher sales.
In markets where they o¤er fewer products, rms concentrate activity in these core varieties by
dropping low-quality peripheral goods on the extensive margin and by shifting sales towards
top-quality products on the intensive margin. Finally, rmsexport dynamics follow systematic
reallocations of activity across the product quality ladder, both in general and in response to
exogenous trade reforms such as the removal of MFA quotas on textiles and apparel.
Our results inform the determinants of rms export success and the design of export-
promoting policies in developing economies. They also have implications for the measurement
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of multi-product rmsproductivity and performance in environments with e¢ ciency, quality,
and mark-up variation across rms and products. More broadly, we shed light on the impact
of trade reforms and other economic shocks such as exchange rate uctuations at the rm and
aggregate levels, as well as on the adjustment process mediating this impact. An important
avenue for future research is understanding how quality di¤erentiation across rms and across
products within rms a¤ects the welfare and distributional consequences of international trade.
Two key considerations in this context are the production complementarities between input qual-
ity, worker skill, and managerial capacity, and frictions in the allocation of resources across rms
and across product lines within rms.
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7 Online Appendix: Formal Theoretical Model
The conceptual framework in Section 2 allows us to introduce the key economic mechanisms of
interest with minimal assumptions on the economic environment. In particular, it requires no
assumptions on the underlying demand structure (e.g. CES vs. linear demand), nature of rm
competition (e.g. monopolistic vs. Bertrand competition), or production technology (e.g. total
cost function, quantity production function, quality production function). This appendix illus-
trates how the main theoretical propositions can be formally derived from closed-form solutions
in specic frameworks that place more structure on the economic environment.
We incorporate e¢ ciency and quality variation across rms and across products within rms
in two existing models of multi-product rms: Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010) (henceforth
BRS) and Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016) (henceforth MMO). In the former case we follow
closely the analysis in Bloom et al (2016). We consider both in order to compare environments
with constant and with variable mark-ups.
We focus on how production e¢ ciency and product quality shape the operational decisions
of multi-product rms regarding their optimal range of products and markets and their optimal
distribution of quality, prices and sales across these products and markets. The theory retains
most features of BRS and MMO but inverts the relationships between rm prices and various
export outcomes, because higher prices are associated with better quality and superior perfor-
mance. For expositional simplicity, we examine rm activity in partial equilibrium. In general
equilibrium, the sunk entry costs would pin down a free entry condition that clears the labor
market, but the empirically relevant predictions of the model would not change qualitatively.
7.1 Production technology
Consider a world with J +1 countries. In each country, a continuum of heterogeneous rms pro-
duce horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated goods. In order to begin production, rms have to
incur sunk entry costs associated with research and product development. Firms face uncertainty
about their production costs and product quality, and observe them only after completing this
irreversible investment. At that point, rms decide whether to exit immediately, sell at home or
export. To economize on notation, we do not include subscripts indicating the exporting country.
We adopt a reduced-form specication of the quantity and quality production functions that
is consistent with evidence in the prior literature of a positive correlation between product quality,
input prices and output prices (Verhoogen 2008, Kugler-Verhoogen 2012, Manova-Zhang 2012,
Crozet et al 2011, Iacovone-Javorcik 2010). For expositional simplicity, we do not explicitly model
rmsinput choice but follow Baldwin-Harrigan (2011) in assuming that product quality is xed
by a marginal cost draw.28 There is a unique input factor, labor, whose wage is normalized to
1 to serve as the numeraire. Manufacturing goods of higher quality is associated with higher
marginal costs because it requires the use of more sophisticated - and thus more expenive - inputs
and assembly technologies.
The quality of a rms product is determined by two components: rm-wide ability ' (0;1)
drawn from a distribution g('), and rm-product specic expertise i (0;1) drawn from a
distribution z(). At a marginal cost of 'i workers, the rm can produce one unit of product
i with quality qi ('; i) = ('i)
1+,  >  1. This parameterization captures the idea that abler
rms can o¤er higher quality across the full range of their product space for given expertise
draws, for example because they have better management, equipment or marketing. At the
same time, the success of research and product development may di¤er across products within
a rm, resulting in varying degrees of expertise and product quality. g(') and z() are assumed
independent of each other and common across rms with continuous cumulative distribution
functions G(') and Z() respectively, while  is i.i.d. across products and rms.
28See Verhoogen (2008) and Johnson (2012) for models in which more productive rms optimally choose to
use higher quality inputs or adopt a more expensive technology to produce higher-quality goods. Endogenizing
product quality in this way would not change the qualitative predictions of the model.
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7.2 Firm behavior under CES demand
Set up
We rst study rm behavior when consumers exhibit love of variety such that the represen-
tative consumer in country j has a CES utility function:
Uj =
"Z
i2
j
(qjixji)
 di
# 1

: (10)
Here qji and xji represent the quality and quantity consumed by country j of variety i, and 
j is
the set of goods available to j. The elasticity of substitution across products is   1=(1 ) > 1
with 0 <  < 1. If total expenditure in country j is Rj , js demand for variety i is
xji = RjP
 1
j q
 1
ji p
 
ji , where Pj =
"Z
i2
j

pji
qji
1 
di
# 1
1 
(11)
is a quality-adjusted ideal price index and pji is the price of that variety in country j. In this
set up, quality is dened as any intrinsic characteristic, taste preference or other demand shock
that increases the consumer appeal of a product given its price.
As standard with CES demand, a number of additional assumptions about rmscost struc-
ture are required in order to match important patterns in the data. Aside from the sunk entry
cost, rms also face a xed operation cost of headquarter services fh and a xed management
cost fp for each active product line, in units of labor. This will imply that companies with dif-
ferent ability draws will choose to produce a di¤erent number of products. Entering each foreign
market j is associated with additional headquarter services fhj necessary for complying with
customs and other regulations, as well as for the maintenance of distribution networks. Because
of this xed cost, some low-ability sellers in the domestic market will not become exporters or
will supply some but not all countries. Finally, exporting entails additional destination-product
specic xed costs fpj (constant across products within j, but varying across countries), which
reect market research, advertising, product customization and standardization. There are also
variable transportation costs of the iceberg kind such that  j units of a good need to be shipped
for 1 unit to arrive. These trade costs will ensure that rms might not o¤er every product they
sell at home in every market they enter.
Production and exporting
With monopolistic competition and a continuum of varieties, rms take all price indices Pj
as given, and maximize prots separately in each country-product market. In particular, a rm
with ability ' will choose the price and output level of a product with expertise draw i in
country j by solving
max
p;x
ji ('; i) = pji ('; i)xji ('; i)   jxji ('; i)'i   fpj (12)
s.t. xji ('; i) = RjP  1j qji ('; i)
 1 pji ('; i)  .
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Producers will therefore charge a constant mark-up 1 over marginal cost and earn the fol-
lowing revenues and prots:
pji ('; i) =
 j'i

; rji ('; i) = Rj

Pj
 j
 1
('i)
( 1) ; ji ('; i) =
rji ('; i)

  fpj .
(13)
When j corresponds to the rms home market, there are no iceberg costs ( j = 1) and the
destination-product xed cost fpj is replaced by the product-specic overhead cost fp. Note that
the empirical analysis examines free-on-board export prices and revenues, that is pfobji ('; i) =
'i
 and r
fob
ji ('; i) = Rj (Pj)
 1 ('i)( 1).
If  =  1, the model would reduce to the original BRS framework in which rms (rm-
products) with lower marginal costs 'i set lower prices and earn higher revenues and prots.
While there would be quality di¤erentiation across rms and products if  ( 1; 0), quality would
not increase su¢ ciently quickly with marginal costs to overturn these predictions. When  > 0,
however, quality does rise su¢ ciently quickly with marginal costs to matter: Within a given
product category, more successful rms now enjoy bigger revenues and prots despite charging
higher prices because they o¤er products of better quality. Across products within a rm, more
expensive varieties are of higher quality and generate higher revenues and prots. To emphasize
the role of quality di¤erentiation, we focus on  > 0 below.
Consumer love of variety and the presence of product specic overhead costs fp imply that no
rm will export a product without also selling it at home. In turn, rms optimally manufacture
only goods for which they can earn non-negative prots domestically. Since prots increase in
expertise, for each ability draw ', there is a zero-prot expertise level  (') below which the
rm will not make i. This value is dened by:
rd ('; 
 (')) = fp, (14)
where d indicates that revenues are calculated for the domestic market.
Recall that product expertise is independently and identically distributed across goods. By
the law of large numbers, the measure of varieties that a rm with ability ' will produce equals
the probability of an expertise draw above  ('), or [1  Z ( ('))]. Since d (') =d' < 0,
higher-ability rms will have a lower zero-prot expertise cut-o¤ and o¤er more products. One
interpretation of this result is that abler rms bring superior managerial, equipment or marketing
quality to any product. This can partially o¤set using less skilled workers or inputs of lower
quality such that output quality and consumer appeal remain high.
Turning to exporting, rms will only introduce a product in a given market if they expect to
make positive prots. Since prots rise with product expertise, a rm with ability ' will export
product i to country j only if its expertise draw is no lower than j (') given by:
rj
 
'; j (')

= fpj . (15)
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The measure of products that rm ' exports to j will thus equal

1  Z  xj ('). Since
dj (') =d' < 0, abler rms export more products than less able rms to any given destination.
When the exporting expertise cut-o¤ lies above the zero-prot expertise cut-o¤, j (') >
 ('), there will be selection into exporting. Across products within a rm, not all goods sold
at home will be shipped to j. Similarly, across rms supplying a product domestically, not all will
be able to market it abroad. Given the prevalence of both patterns in the empirical literature,
we assume that j (') > 
 (') holds for all j.
For every ability ', the expertise cut-o¤ for exporting will vary across destinations because
the market size Rj , price index Pj , variable  j and xed fpj trade costs are country specic.
Firms therefore adjust their product range across markets. In particular, each exporter follows a
unique hierarchy of products in every destination and adds goods in decreasing order of product
quality (and marginal cost) until it reaches the marginal product which brings zero prots.
Within a supplier, higher-quality goods will be shipped to more countries, earn higher revenues
in any given market, and generate higher worldwide sales. A rms core, top-selling variety in
every market will be its most expensive, highest-quality item.
The nature of this product ladder is the main dimension along which the model with multi-
product, multi-quality rms di¤ers from BRS. In the absence of quality di¤erentiation across
goods, rmscore competences lie in their cheapest varieties. This means that when  < 0, rms
expand their product range by adding products in increasing order of marginal cost.
CES preferences imply that within a rm, the ratio of two goodsrevenues in a given market
does not depend on product scope. It is instead pinned down by the ratio of the suppliers ex-
pertise in manufacturing these varieties: rj1 ('; 1) =rj2 ('; 2) = (1=2)
( 1). In other words,
when rms enlarge or contract their product range, this a¤ects their product mix (extensive
margin) but not the sales distribution across inframarginal products (intensive margin).
7.3 Firm behavior under linear demand
Set up
We next examine the decisions of multi-product rms when consumer preferences take a
di¤erent form:
Uj = xj0 + 
Z
i2
j
qjixjidi  1
2

Z
i2
j
(qjixji)
2 di  1
2

"Z
i2
j
qjixjidi
#2
, (16)
where xj0 is the consumption level of a homogeneous numeraire good in country j. As before, qji
and xji represent the quality and quantity consumed of variety i, and 
j is the set of di¤erentiated
goods available to j. The parameters  > 0 and  > 0 govern the elasticity of substitution
between the numeraire and the di¤erentiated products, while  > 0 captures the degree of
product di¤erentiation across varieties i. Denoting total expenditure in country j as Rj , this
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utility function gives rise to linear demand for item i:
xji =
Rj
qji
 bPj   pji
qji

, where bPj = MjPj + 
Mj + 
and Pj =
1
Mj
Z
i2
j
pji
qji
di. (17)
Here Mj is the measure of varieties consumed in j, and Pj their average quality-adjusted price.
Notably, bPj is a quality-adjusted price ceiling, above which demand is 0. Combined with an
iceberg transportation cost  j , this choke price will be su¢ cient to generate selection of rms
into exporting, as well as selection of products within rms into specic foreign markets. For
expositional simplicity, we therefore follow standard practice in the literature and assume away
all xed production and trade costs that entered the CES case above.
Production and exporting
As before, rms are atomistic and take all price indices as given. To maximize prots,
producers therefore choose their price and output level separately in each destination-product
market:
max
p;x
ji ('; i) = pji ('; i)xji ('; i)   jxji ('; i)'i (18)
s.t. xji ('; i) =
Rj
qji ('; i)
 bPj   pji ('; i)
qji ('; i)

.
Firmsoptimal price, mark-up m, revenues and prots for product i in country j are now
given by:
pji ('; i) =
1
2
h bPj ('i)1+ +  j'ii ; mji ('; i) = 1
2
h bPj ('i)1+    j'ii ; (19)
rji ('; i) =
Rj
4
h bP 2j   2j ('i) 2i ; ji ('; i) = Rj4 h bPj    j ('i) i2 .
The case of  =  1 corresponds to the MMO model, in which rms (rm-products) with lower
marginal costs 'i have lower prices, higher revenues and bigger prots. The same is true if
 ( 1; 0) and quality increases only slowly with marginal costs. When  > 0, however, these
patterns are reversed: Now rms earn greater revenues and prots from their more expensive
varieties because they o¤er consumers superior quality. This is the case we study below.
Reasoning as before, rms will observe a strict hierarchy of products based on their quality
level. In each market they enter, they will start with the same core variety and add more goods
in decreasing order of expertise. Since prots rise monotonically with quality, rm 's optimal
product range in market j will be determined by an expertise threshold j (') for which prots
are 0. Similarly, the producer will make only goods above a zero-prot expertise level  (')
determined in its domestic market d where  j = 1. These cut-o¤s are dened by:
bPd = (' ('))  and bPj =  j  'j (')  . (20)
When j (') > 
 ('), there will be selection into exporting and not all goods ' sells at
home will be shipped to j. Once again, abler rms export more products than less able rms to
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any given destination because dj (') =d' < 0. Moreover, a given supplier will vary its product
scope across countries in response to di¤erences in market conditions as summarized by bPj and
 j . In particular, rms export fewer goods to tougher markets where the choke price bPj is lower.
These results are all qualitatively the same as with CES preferences. An important dis-
tinguishing feature of linear demand, however, is its implication for mark-ups. While constant
under CES, mark-ups now vary across rms, products and destinations in systematic ways. All
else constant, abler producers extract higher mark-ups than less able competitors. Across goods
within a rm, core varieties of higher quality receive higher mark-ups than peripheral varieties of
lower quality. A rms high-quality products thus sell at steeper prices both because they entail
higher marginal costs and because they secure bigger mark-ups. Finally, while marginal cost
and quality are constant across destinations within a rm-product pair, mark-ups and prices are
lower in more competitive markets where the price ceiling bPj is lower.
Recall that the distribution of sales across a rms goods is independent of its product scope
under CES. This is no longer the case with variable mark-ups and linear demand. Within a rm,
the sales ratio of two goods in country j is now rj1 ('; 1) =rj2 ('; 2) = 1+
2j ('2)
 2 2j ('1) 2bP 2j  2j ('2) 2 .
If 1 > 2, this ratio is decreasing in bPj because both its numerator and denominator are
positive. In other words, in tougher markets with lower choke prices bPj , rms shift activity
towards their core high-quality goods both along the extensive and the intensive margin: They
sell fewer varieties by dropping cheaper, lower-quality products and skew sales towards their top,
high-quality products.
7.4 Firm prots
Whether rms operate under CES or linear demand, they enter a given market only if total
expected revenues there exceed all associated costs. The export prots in country j of a rm
with ability ' are:
j (') =
Z 1
j (')
j ('; ) z () d  fhj . (21)
Recall that the destination-specic overhead headquarters costs fhj have been normalized to 0
for the case of linear demand.
Abler rms have a lower exporting expertise cut-o¤ j (') and sell more products in j. They
also earn higher revenues from each good than rms with the same product expertise draw but
lower ability. Since export prots j (') increase with ability, only rms with ability above a
cut-o¤ level 'j will service destination j, where '

j satises:
j
 
'j

= 0. (22)
With asymmetric countries, 'j varies across destinations and abler rms enter more markets
because they are above the exporting ability cut-o¤ for more countries. Abler exporters thus
outperform less able producers along all three export margins: number of export destinations,
product range in each country, and sales in each destination-product market.
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Finally, not all rms that incur the sunk cost of entry survive. Once they observe their ability
and expertise draws, rms begin production only if their expected prots from all domestic and
foreign operations are non-negative. Firm 's total prots are given by:
 (') =
Z 1
(')
d ('; ) z () d+
X
j
 Z 1
j (')
j ('; ) z () d  fhj
!
  fh, (23)
where we have assumed that the xed cost of headquarter services fh = 0 under linear demand.
The rst integral in this expression captures the rms domestic prots from all products above
its expertise cut-o¤ for production  ('), while the summation represents worldwide export
prots from all traded products and destinations.
Total prots increase in ' because abler rms sell more products domestically, earn higher
domestic revenues for each product, and have superior export performance as described above.
Companies below a minimum ability level ' are therefore unable to break even and exit imme-
diately upon learning their attributes. This cut-o¤ is dened by the zero-prot condition:
 (') = 0. (24)
7.5 Empirical Predictions
We now summarize the testable theoretical predictions that make it possible to empirically
distinguish between models of multi-product rms with and without quality di¤erentiation, as
well as between models with constant and with variable mark-ups. We state all results in terms
of  > 0 and  < 0, since quality di¤erentiation a¤ects observed rm outcomes in the data only in
the former case. We discuss CES vs. linear demand when there are material di¤erences between
the two.
Variation across rms within a product
Within a given product category, the correlation between price and revenue across rms
depends on the extent of quality di¤erentiation. This is a central result in the prior literature
and not novel to our framework. We restate it here for completeness.
Proposition 5 If  > 0, product prices and revenues are positively correlated across rms within
a product and across rms within a destination-product market. If  < 0, these correlations are
negative.
Variation across products within a rm
In the absence of vertical di¤erentiation across products, rmscore products have low mar-
ginal costs and prices. By contrast, when there is scope for quality upgrading, rmsbest-selling
varieties are associated with better quality, higher marginal costs and higher prices.
Proposition 6 If  > 0, product prices are positively correlated with worldwide revenues across
products within a rm and with bilateral revenues across products within a rm-destination. If
 < 0, these correlations are negative.
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Variation across destinations within a rm: product scope and product hierarchies
Multi-product rms observe a hierarchy of products. Each rm focuses on its core com-
petences and drops its peripheral goods in destinations where it sells fewer products This has
implications for a rms average price pj (') across the products it o¤ers in market j:
CES: pj (') =
 j'

Z 1
j (')
z () d, LD: pj (') =
1
2
Z 1
j (')
h bPj (')1+ +  j'i z () d.
(25)
Consider rst the case of CES preferences and constant mark-ups. Under quality sorting,
exporters add varieties in decreasing order of marginal cost and quality. Firm ' will thus o¤er
lower average quality at a lower average price in countries where it exports more products,
i.e. j (') is lower. In the absence of quality di¤erentiation, product scope and pj (') are
instead positively correlated across destinations within rms, because exporters add products in
increasing order of marginal cost.
Note that pj (') is an arithmetic mean. One could alternatively consider a sales-weighted
average price, epj (') = j' Z 1
j (')
rj(';)
rj(')
z () d where rj (') =
Z 1
j (')
rj ('; ) z () d are to-
tal rm revenues in j. The correlation of product scope with epj (') is, however, thereotically
ambiguous. With quality sorting for example, when rms expand their product range they add
low-quality cheap products, but these goods generate limited revenues. If the former e¤ect is
su¢ ciently strong, epj (') will fall with product scope, but less quickly than the simple average.
Consider next the case of linear demand. Under quality di¤erentiation, the relationship be-
tween product range and the average price across markets within rms is thereotically ambiguous
because of two opposing forces. In less competitive markets, rms sell more low-quality varieties
which tends to lower pj ('), but they also set higher mark-ups which tends to increase pj (').
The net e¤ect is thus indeterminate. Without quality variation, both mechanisms go in the same
direction such that product scope and pj (') are unambiguously positively correlated.
Proposition 7 Firms observe a hierarchy of products in all markets. If  > 0, product scope is
positively or negatively correlated with average price across destinations within a rm. If  < 0,
this correlation is unambiguously positive.
Variation across destinations within a rm: product scope and rm sales
All else constant, rms earn higher revenues in destinations where they ship more goods.
Depending on the structure of demand, the distribution of sales across products may or may not
change with the number of varieties sold. These relationships hold regardless of the presence and
extent of quality di¤erentiation in the market.
Proposition 8 Product scope is positively correlated with total bilateral revenues across desti-
nations within a rm. With CES demand, the distribution of sales across products is una¤ected
by product scope. With linear demand, the distribution of sales is more skewed towards rms
core products in markets where they sell fewer products.
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# Obs Average St Dev Min 5th Percentile
95th 
Percentile Max
Panel A. Variation across firms within products
1. firm-product-year prices
(product-year FE) 6,185,641 0.00 1.32 -15.30 -2.01 2.16 14.07
2. firm-product-destination-year
prices (product-year FE) 14,351,836 0.00 1.24 -16.59 -1.92 2.01 14.30
3. st dev of prices across firms
within dest-product-year triplets 
(dest-product-year FE)
1,071,478 0.89 0.73 0.00 0.07 2.28 10.02
Panel B. Variation across products within firms
4. st dev of prices across
products within firm-year pairs 
(firm-year FE, product-year FE)
547,534 0.84 0.63 0.00 0.12 2.05 9.29
5. st dev of prices across
products within firm-dest-year 
triplets (firm-dest-year FE, 
product-year FE)
2,200,442 0.75 0.63 0.00 0.07 1.94 9.77
Product Rank by Sales 1 2 3 4 5 >5 Total
Product Rank by Price
1 5.47% 2.15% 1.18% 0.75% 0.51% 2.13% 12.19%
2 2.27% 2.30% 1.14% 0.69% 0.47% 1.99% 8.86%
3 1.23% 1.22% 1.26% 0.71% 0.46% 1.91% 6.79%
4 0.76% 0.74% 0.76% 0.81% 0.48% 1.88% 5.43%
5 0.51% 0.50% 0.51% 0.51% 0.55% 1.87% 4.45%
>5 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.96% 1.97% 52.51% 62.28%
Total 12.19% 8.86% 6.79% 5.43% 4.45% 62.28% 100.00%
Table 1. Variation in Export Prices across Firms, Products and Destinations
This table summarizes the variation in f.o.b. export prices across firms, products, and destinations in the 2002-2006 panel. Line 1 (Line 2):
summary statistics for firm-product-year (firm-product-destination-year) log prices, after taking out product-year pair fixed effects. Line 3: for
each destination-product-year market with multiple Chinese exporters, we record the standard deviation of log prices across firms, after taking
out destination-product-year triple fixed effects. Line 3 shows how this standard deviation varies across destination-product-year triplets. Line
4 (Line 5): for each multi-product firm, we record the standard deviation of log prices across products by year (by destination-year). Line 4
(Line 5) shows how this standard deviation varies across firm-year (firm-destination-year) observations. 
Table 2. Firms' Product Rank by Export Prices and Sales
This table ranks products within multi-product firms based on either worldwide export revenues (columns) or export price (rows), separately for
each year in the 2002-2006 panel. The product with the highest sales (price) in each firm-year is ranked first, the second highest receives rank
2, etc. For each firm-product-year triplet, we construct the export price as the ratio of worldwide export revenues and quantities, demeaned by
its product-year average across firms. Each cell in the table shows what percent of all firm-product pairs receive a certain rank by price and
revenue, averaged across all years.
Dependent variable: (log) export price by firm, product and year
Market Rauch R&D Adv + R&D Product
Power Dummy Intensity Intensity Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) Sales 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.055*** 1.006***
(61.07) (62.28) (19.75) (47.91) (44.61) (3.79) (385.57)
Market Share -0.415***
(-17.58)
(log) Sales x 0.019*** 0.270*** 0.065**  
Quality Differentiation (13.94) (9.94) (2.28)
Quality Differentiation -0.206*** -4.767***  0.336
(-15.93) (-18.95) (1.48)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.72 0.56
# observations 4,127,779 4,127,779 2,857,087 3,995,973 4,013,020 4,127,779 4,127,779
# firms 175,949 175,949 156,088 170,785 171,608 175,949 175,949
Dependent variable: (log) export price by firm, product, destination and year
Market Rauch R&D Adv + R&D Product
Power Dummy Intensity Intensity Rank
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) Sales 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.065*** 0.898*** 
(41.24) (41.99) (19.95) (28.64) (27.68) (3.40) (219.13) 
Market Share -0.072***
(-6.94)
(log) Sales x 0.012*** 0.396*** 0.188*** 
Quality Differentiation (7.09) (11.45)  (5.12) 
Quality Differentiation -0.178***  -6.331*** -1.570***
(-12.35) (-20.21) (-5.47)   
Firm-Dest-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.72 0.61
# observations 9,481,443 9,481,443 6,533,138 9,247,765 9,290,452 9,481,443 9,481,443
# firm-dest pairs 175,949 175,949 156,088 170,785 171,608 175,949 175,949
This table examines the relationship between bilateral export prices and revenues across products within firm-destination-years. For each firm,
product, destination and year, the log price is demeaned by its product-destination-year average across firms. In Column 2 market power is proxied
by the firm's share of total Chinese exports by product-destination-year. Product scope for quality differentiation is measured as in Table 3. Column
6 uses products' rank by price and revenues across products within each firm-destination-year triplet instead of log price and log revenues. In
Column 7 log price is replaced by inferred log quality as in Table 3. All regressions include a constant term and firm-destination-year triple fixed
effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10%
level.
Baseline (log) Quality
Table 3. Worldwide Export Prices and Sales across Products within Firms
This table examines the relationship between worldwide export prices and revenues across products within firm-years. For each firm-product-year
triplet, the log export price is the log ratio of worldwide export revenues and quantities, demeaned by its product-year average across firms. In
Column 2 market power is proxied by the firm's share of total Chinese exports by product-year. Product scope for quality differentiation is proxied by
the Rauch dummy for differentiated goods (Column 3), sectors' R&D intensity (Column 4), or sectors' combined advertising and R&D intensity
(Column 5). Column 6 uses products' rank by price and revenues across products within each firm-year instead of log price and log revenues. In
Column 7 log price is replaced by a proxy for log quality constructed from data on export prices and quantities. All regressions include a constant
term and firm-year pair fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Baseline (log) Quality
Table 4. Bilateral Export Prices and Sales across Products within Firm-Destination Pairs
Baseline Market Power Hom Goods Diff Goods Proc Imports HS3 Product (log) Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) Input Price  0.134*** 0.134*** 0.088*** 0.111***  0.176*** 0.191*** 0.120***
(30.66) (30.69) (7.25) (29.89) (20.88) (34.89) (27.35)
Input Market Share 0.275
(1.55)
Output Market Share -0.120***
(-4.60)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.53 0.41 0.45 0.58 0.40
# observations 1,031,424 1,031,424 60,165 621,297 534,580 393,820 1,031,424
# firms 68,925 68,925 12,748 53,240 40,508 68,925 68,925
# product categories 7,039 7,039 1,283 3,026 6,231 171 7,039
Baseline Market Power Hom Goods Diff Goods Proc Imports IO Sector (log) Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(log) Input Price 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.032** 0.110*** 0.142*** 0.161*** 0.109***
(17.86) (17.86) (2.04） (14.00) (11.81) (25.35) (14.12)
Input Market Share -0.165
(-0.76)
Output Market Share 2.473
(1.26)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.58 0.43 0.38 0.50 0.39
# observations 2,403,309 2,403,309 153,737 1,519,333 1,487,247 818,560 2,403,309
# firms 99,694 99,694 27,540 83,356 61,035 99,694 99,694
# product categories 6,418 6,418 1,275 2,759 6,175 92 6,418
Panel B. Input price based on all imports and IO tables
Table 5. Export Prices and Imported-Input Prices across Products within Firms
This table examines the relationship between firms' export prices and imported-input prices across products within firm-years. The outcome
variable is firms' log export price by HS 8-digit product and year, except in Column 6 where it is the weighted average annual log export price
by HS 3-digit product or by IO sector using export revenues as weights. The input price is the weighted average of log import prices for inputs
matched to the output product, using import values as weights. It is based on imports in the same HS 3-digit product category (Panel A) or on
all inputs using input-output tables (Panel B). All prices have been demeaned by their product-year average across firms before any further
manipulation. In Column 2 market power in output markets is proxied by the firm's share of total Chinese exports by product category and year;
market power in input markets is proxied by the firm's average share of total Chinese imports across all inputs matched to the output product,
by year. Column 3 (4) restricts the sample to homogeneous (differentiated) export products. In Column 5 only processing imports enter the
calculation. In Column 7 the export and imported-input log prices are replaced by inferred export-product and imported-input log quality as in
Table 3. All regressions include a constant term and firm-year pair fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Dependent variable: (log) export price by firm, product category and year
Panel A. Input price based on imports in same HS-3 product category
Baseline Market Power Hom Goods Diff Goods Weighted Avg Baseline Weighted Avg
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(log) # Products 1.714*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 0.001 -0.024*** -0.002 -0.035*** 0.899*** 
(333.42) (-15.53)  (-15.69) (0.28) (-15.90) (-1.35) (-5.65) (124.08)
Market Share -0.011**
(-2.48)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.54 0.56
# observations 3,236,020 3,236,020 3,236,020 388,613 2,272,354 3,236,020 3,236,020 3,236,020
# firms 175,949 175,949 175,949 50,659 142,559 175,949 175,949 175,949
Table 6. Product Scope, Exports and Average Price across Destinations within Firms
This table examines the relationship between bilateral export revenues, average export price, average quality, and product scope across destinations within
firm-years. Product scope is measured by the log number of products a firm exports to a given destination, by year. For each firm, product, destination and
year, we first demean the log price by its product-destination-year average across firms. We then construct the average log export price at the firm-destination-
year level as the arithmetic average of these demeaned prices (Columns 2-5) or their weighted average using the firms' export revenues in that destination
and year as weights (Column 6). In Column 3 market power is proxied by the firm's average share of total Chinese exports across all its products by
destination-year. Column 4 (5) restricts the sample to homogeneous (differentiated) goods. In Columns 7-8 log price is replaced by inferred log quality as in
Table 3. All regressions include a constant term and firm-year pair fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Dep Variable (log) Sales
Avg (log) Price Avg (log) Quality
Dep Variable 10th Perc 90th Perc
All Hom Goods Diff Goods All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Products 0.450*** 0.351*** 0.440*** -0.018*** 0.851***
(39.67) (14.70) (39.39) (-2.45) (34.81) 
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.72 0.67 0.70 0.30 0.83
# observations 3,236,020 388,613 2,272,355 1,445,003 1,445,003
# firms 175,949 50,659 142,559 130,631 130,631
Dep Variable 10th Perc 90th Perc
All Hom Goods Diff Goods All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Products 0.030** -0.000 0.036*** -0.319*** 0.367***
(2.11) (-0.05) (3.38) (-19.80) (30.48)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.91 0.86 0.90 0.69 0.96
# observations 3,236,020 388,613 2,272,355 1,445,003 1,445,003
# firms 175,949 50,659 142,559 130,631 130,631
Dep Variable 10
th Perc 90th Perc
All Hom Goods Diff Goods All All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Products 0.235*** 0.013*** 0.227*** -0.147*** 0.585***
(15.24) (6.11) (17.74) (-13.32) (30.66)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.85 0.77 0.84 0.57 0.91
# observations 3,236,020 388,613 2,272,355 1,445,003 1,445,003
# firms 175,949 50,659 142,559 130,631 130,631
Panel C. Products ranked by global quality
Average Rank
Table 7. Export Product Scope and Product Rank across Destinations within Firms
This table shows that firms focus on their core, expensive, high-quality products in markets where they export fewer
products. Product scope is measured by the log number of products a firm exports to a given destination, by year. For
each firm-year, we rank products globally based on the firm's worldwide export revenues (Panel A), worldwide export
prices (demeaned by their product-year average across firms) (Panel B), or inferred worldwide quality as in Table 3
(Panel C). The top product receives rank 1 and the bottom product - a rank equal to the number of products the firm
exports. Using these global product rankings, we record the average, 10th percentile and 90th percentile rank observed
across the products a firm exports to a given destination-year. Column 2 (3) restricts the sample to homogeneous
(differentiated) goods. Columns 4-5 restrict the sample to firm-destination-years with 2 or more products. All regressions
include a constant term and firm-year pair fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors
clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel B. Products ranked by global price
Average Rank
Panel A. Products ranked by global sales
Average Rank
Product Rank By
All Hom Goods Diff Goods All Hom Goods Diff Goods All Hom Goods Diff Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(log) # Products -0.419*** -0.628***  -0.415*** -0.169*** -0.189*** -0.205*** -0.314*** -0.144*** -0.301***
(-99.11) (-26.81)  (-83.44) (-27.00) (-24.31) (-17.22) (-49.82) (-4.97 ) (-42.40)
Firm-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.50 0.60 0.53 0.28 0.51 0.34 0.32 0.53 0.36
# observations 1,445,003 95,380 954,562 1,445,003 95,380 954,562 1,445,003 95,380 954,562
# firms 130,631 21,640 98,684 130,631 21,640 98,684 130,631 21,640 98,684
Bilateral Sales Bilateral Quality
Dependent variable: (log) ratio of exports of top-ranked to second-ranked product, by firm, destination and year
Table 8. Export Product Scope and Sales Distribution across Destinations within Firms
This table shows that firms concentrate sales in their core, expensive, high-quality products in markets where they export fewer products. The outcome variable is the log ratio of the
sales of a firm's top-ranked product to the sales of its second-ranked product, by destination-year. For each firm-destination-year, we rank products bilaterally based on the firm's
bilateral export revenues (Columns 1-3), bilateral export prices (demeaned by their product-destination-year average across firms) (Columns 4-6), or bilateral inferred quality as in
Table 3 (Columns 7-9). Columns 2, 5 and 8 (3, 6 and 9) restrict the sample to homogeneous (differentiated) goods. All regressions include a constant term and firm-year pair fixed
effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Bilateral Price
Panel A. Full panel, 2002-2006
Dep Variable
(Sample)
Product Attribute (log) Salest=0
(log) Price
t=0
(log) Quality
t=0
(log) Sales
t=1
(log) Price
t=1
(log) Quality
t=1
(log) Sales
t=0
(log) Price
t=0
(log) Quality
t=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Product Attribute -0.061*** -0.002** -0.012*** -0.056*** 0.004*** -0.010*** -0.421*** -0.126*** -0.142***  
(-96.13) (-2.10) (-48.18) (-117.55) (5.92) (-53.26) (-92.64) (-11.02) (-55.06)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.37 0.29 0.31 0.35 0.26 0.27 0.48 0.35 0.40
# observations 347,288 347,288 347,288 407,412 407,413 407,414 143,881 143,882 143,883
# firms 42,521 42,521 42,522 42,521 42,522 42,523 37,867 37,868 37,869
Panel B. MFA reform, 2004-2006
Dep Variable
(Sample)
Product Attribute (log) Salest=0
(log) Price
t=0
(log) Quality
t=0
(log) Sales
t=1
(log) Price
t=1
(log) Quality
t=1
(log) Sales
t=0
(log) Price
t=0
(log) Quality
t=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Product Attribute -0.075*** -0.013*** -0.022*** -0.068*** -0.003 -0.022*** -0.449*** -0.115*** -0.186***
(-57.15) (-3.39) (-26.23) (-66.63) (-0.80) (-32.01) (-37.33) (-3.47) (-27.57)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.39 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.31 0.51 0.38 0.44
# observations 46,625 46,625 46,625 63,828 63,828 63,828 24,178 24,178 24,178
# firms 8,682 8,682 8,682 8,682 8,682 8,682 7,226 7,226 7,226
Table 9. Export Dynamics across Products within Firms
This table examines how firms adjust activity across products over time. Panel A considers adjustments within surviving firms from 2002 to 2006. Panel B considers
adjustments within surviving firms in the textiles and apparel industries from 2004 to 2006 in response to the removal of MFA quotas in 2005. In Columns 1-3 the sample
includes all firm-products exported at t=0, and the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm does not export the product at t=1. In Columns 4-6 the sample
includes all firm-products exported at t=1, and the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm did not export the product at t=0. In Columns 7-9 the sample
includes all firm-products exported at both t=0 and t=1, and the dependent variable is the change in log export revenues from t=0 to t=1. The product attribute on the right-hand
side is worldwide log revenues, log price or log quality by firm-product at t=0 or t=1 as indicated in the column heading. All regressions include a constant term and firm fixed
effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Drop Dummy, t=1
(Products traded at t=0)
Add Dummy, t=1
(Products traded at t=1)
Δ (log) Sales
(Products traded at t=0 & t=1)
Drop Dummy, t=1
(Products traded at t=0)
Add Dummy, t=1
(Products traded at t=1)
Δ (log) Sales
(Products traded at t=0 & t=1)
Panel A. Full panel, 2002-2006
Dep Variable
Product Rank By Bilateral Sales
Bilateral 
Price
Bilateral 
Quality Global Sales
Global
Price
Global 
Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ (log) # Products 1.234*** -0.551*** -0.175*** -0.455***
(121.85) (-29.65) (-4.30) (-11.44)  
Δ # Products 0.532*** 0.028 0.346***
(15.48) (0.94) (9.17)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.47 0.49 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.72 0.55
# observations 170,083 68,538 68,538 68,538 170,083 170,083 170,083
# firms 39,701 24,206 24,206 24,206 39,701 39,701 39,701
Panel B. MFA reform, 2004-2006
Dep Variable
Product Rank By Bilateral Sales
Bilateral 
Price
Bilateral 
Quality Global Sales
Global
Price
Global 
Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Δ (log) # Products 1.183*** -0.503*** -0.231* -0.470***
(40.31) (-10.39) (-1.87) (-4.69) 
Δ # Products 0.762*** 0.165 0.550***
(9.93) (1.03) (5.63)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.61 0.59 0.48 0.49 0.39 0.69 0.48
# observations 20,569 8,988 8,988 8,988 20,569 20,569 20,569
# firms 7,474 4,034 4,034 4,034 7,474 7,474 7,474
Δ (log) Sales
Δ Concentration Ratio Δ Average Rank
Table 10. Export Dynamics across Destinations within Firms
This table examines how firms adjust activity across destinations over time. Panel A considers adjustments within surviving firms from
2002 to 2006. Panel B considers adjustments within surviving firms in the textiles and apparel industries from 2004 to 2006 in response
to the removal of MFA quotas in 2005. In Column 1 the outcome variable is the change in bilateral log export revenues from t=0 to t=1. In
Columns 2-4 the outcome variable is the change in the log ratio of the sales of a firm's top-ranked product to the sales of its second-
ranked product, where product rank is based on firms' bilateral export revenues, price and quality as in Table 8. In Columns 5-7 the
outcome variable is the change in the average global product rank across the products a firm exports to a given destination, where
product rank is based on firms' worldwide export revenues, price and quality as in Table 7. All regressions include a constant term and
firm fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at
the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Δ (log) Sales
Δ Concentration Ratio Δ Average Rank
Dep Variable
Firm Attribute Avg Export Price
Avg Export 
Quality
Avg Import 
Input Price
Avg Import 
Input Quality
St Dev Export 
Price
St Dev Export 
Quality
St Dev Import 
Input Price
St Dev Import 
Input Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Attribute2002 0.055*** 0.099*** 0.078*** 0.054*** 0.105*** 0.072*** 0.346*** 0.081***
(5.88) (43.86) (7.74) (23.67) (6.59) (19.53) (9.45) (9.87)
R-squared 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
# observations 67,416 67,416 43,180 43,180 48,466 48,466 22,731 22,731
Dep Variable
Firm Attribute Avg Export Price
Avg Export 
Quality
Avg Import 
Input Price
Avg Import 
Input Quality
St Dev Export 
Price
St Dev Export 
Quality
St Dev Import 
Input Price
St Dev Import 
Input Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Firm Attribute2002 0.046*** 0.002 0.168*** 0.041*** 0.108*** 0.019*** 0.108*** 0.019***
(4.99) (1.02) (16.9) (17.98) (6.73) (5.09) (6.73) (5.09)
Log Exports2002 -0.376*** -0.377*** -0.349*** -0.357*** -0.288*** -0.290*** -0.288*** -0.290***
(-72.32) (-71.95) (-54.19) (-54.68) (-46.39) (-46.37) (-46.39) (-46.37)
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
# observations 42,521 42,521 29,549 29,549 32,548 32,548 32,548 32,548
Appendix Table 1. Motivating Facts: Trade Activity, Production Attributes and Product Profile across Firms
This table examines the relationship between firms' trade activity, production attributes and product profile. In Panel A the sample comprises all exporters in
2002, and the outcome variable is firms' log worldwide exports in 2002. In Panel B the sample comprises all firms that exported in both 2002 and 2006, and the
outcome variable is the 2002-2006 change in firms' log worldwide exports. In Panels C and D the sample comprises all exporter-years with balance-sheet data
on firm production attributes, and the outcome variable is indicated in the column heading. For each firm, the average and standard deviation of log export
price, log export quality, log imported-input price, and log imported-input quality are taken over the firm's export products and imported inputs, after these have
been demeaned by their product-year average. Capital intensity is log fixed capital per worker. Skill intensity is the share of employees with a high-school
degree. R&D + Advert Intensity is the share of R&D and advertising expenditures in total sales. All regressions include a constant term and fixed effects for
firms' primary industry of activity, province and ownership type. Panel D also includes year fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Panel A. Export sales, prices and quality across firms, 2002
Log Exports2002
Panel B. Export growth, prices and quality across firms, 2002-2006
Log Exports2006 - Log Exports2002
Dep Variable Avg Export Price
Avg Export 
Quality
Avg Import 
Input Price
Avg Import 
Input Quality
St Dev Export 
Price
St Dev Export 
Quality
St Dev Import 
Input Price
St Dev Import 
Input Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity 0.022*** 0.173*** 0.054*** 0.389*** 0.008** 0.071*** 0.007* 0.012
(Levinsohn-Petrin) (4.08) (7.25) (7.56) (12.19) (2.10) (4.00) (1.87) (0.75)
Log Employment 0.009* 0.176*** 0.087*** 0.589*** 0.027*** 0.207*** 0.028*** 0.130***
(1.93) (8.50) (14.12) (21.60) (8.70) (14.41) (8.72) (9.40)
Capital Intensity 0.017*** 0.144*** 0.126*** 0.624*** 0.011*** 0.070*** 0.017*** 0.047***
(3.67) (7.04) (20.41) (22.61) (3.69) (4.87) (5.61) (3.41)
Skill Intensity 0.249*** 0.724*** 0.275*** 1.118*** 0.107*** 0.494*** 0.056*** 0.210***
(12.30) (7.92) (9.84) (9.06) (7.81) (7.82) (4.12) (3.47)
Log Avg Wage 0.258*** 0.970*** 0.240*** 1.062*** 0.087*** 0.414*** 0.026*** 0.131***
(21.77) (18.25) (16.63) (16.68) (11.00) (11.17) (3.54) (4.10)
R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.16 0.15
# observations 44,086 44,086 28,009 28,009 34,158 34,158 16,673 16,673
Dep Variable Avg Export Price
Avg Export 
Quality
Avg Import 
Input Price
Avg Import 
Input Quality
St Dev Export 
Price
St Dev Export 
Quality
St Dev Import 
Input Price
St Dev Import 
Input Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Productivity 0.013*** 0.133*** 0.009*** 0.096*** 0.057*** 0.425*** 0.010*** 0.022**
(Levinsohn-Petrin) (4.07) (9.22) (4.07) (9.12) (13.57) (22.60) (4.47) (2.28)
Log Employment 0.024*** 0.238*** 0.024*** 0.188*** 0.089*** 0.595*** 0.023*** 0.112***
(8.49) (19.07) (12.98 (21.88) (23.82) (35.87) (12.46) (13.73)
Capital Intensity 0.029*** 0.187*** 0.013*** 0.092*** 0.142*** 0.686*** 0.015*** 0.040***
(11.03) (15.67 (6.93) (10.69) (40.05) (43.43) (8.24) (4.94)
R&D + Advert 1.000*** 2.950*** 0.704*** 2.970*** 1.033*** 3.546*** 0.269*** 1.104***
Intensity (2.61) (2.97) (2.97) (3.44) (3.53) (3.73) (2.89) (3.03)
Log Avg Wage 0.244*** 0.900*** 0.093*** 0.429*** 0.264*** 1.169*** 0.035*** 0.150***
(35.5) (29.65) (21.01) (20.97) (31.85) (31.95) (8.30) (8.11)
R-squared 0.15 0.13 0.27 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.14 0.12
# observations 122,272 122,272 96,909 96,909 77,146 77,146 47,548 47,548
Panel C. Production attributes, prices and quality across firms, 2004
Panel D. Production attributes, prices and quality across firms, 2002, 2005, 2006
Appendix Table 1. Motivating Facts: Trade Activity, Production Attributes and Product Profile across Firms
This table examines the relationship between firms' trade activity, production attributes and product profile. In Panel A the sample comprises all exporters in
2002, and the outcome variable is firms' log worldwide exports in 2002. In Panel B the sample comprises all firms that exported in both 2002 and 2006, and the
outcome variable is the 2002-2006 change in firms' log worldwide exports. In Panels C and D the sample comprises all exporter-years with balance-sheet data
on firm production attributes, and the outcome variable is indicated in the column heading. For each firm, the average and standard deviation of log export
price, log export quality, log imported-input price, and log imported-input quality are taken over the firm's export products and imported inputs, after these have
been demeaned by their product-year average. Capital intensity is log fixed capital per worker. Skill intensity is the share of employees with a high-school
degree. R&D + Advert Intensity is the share of R&D and advertising expenditures in total sales. All regressions include a constant term and fixed effects for
firms' primary industry of activity, province and ownership type. Panel D also includes year fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and *
indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
# Obs Average St Dev Min Max
Panel A. Unit of observation: firm-product-year
Log Exports 4,127,779 9.42 2.78 0.00 22.51
Log Price 4,127,779 0.00 1.32 -12.62 13.71
Log Quality 4,127,779 0.00 6.28 -56.18 58.21
Panel B. Unit of observation: firm-destination-product-year
Log Exports 9,508,299 9.17 2.50 0.00 21.99
Log Price 9,481,443 0.00 1.09 -12.90 13.68
Log Quality 9,481,443 0.00 5.08 -56.81 59.39
Dependent variable: (log) export price by firm, product, destination and year
Rauch R&D Adv + R&D
Dummy Intensity Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(log) Sales 0.083*** 0.038*** 0.079*** 0.068*** 1.332*** 
(70.38) (10.57) (54.58) (36.40) (282.50)
(log) Sales x 0.055*** 0.216*** 0.581***
Quality Differentiation (13.99) (3.43) (9.90)
Dest-Product-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.024 0.028 0.025 0.025 0.285
# observations 9,481,443 6,533,138 9,247,765 9,290,452 9,481,443
# dest-product pairs 1,156,681 737,451 1,109,223 1,118,503 1,156,681
This table examines the relationship between export prices and revenues across firms within a destination-product-
year market in the spirirt of Manova and Zhang (2012). Product scope for quality differentiation is measured as in
Table 3. All regressions include a constant term and destination-product-year triple fixed effects. Robust T-
statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by destination-product. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Baseline
across Firms within Destination-Product Pairs
(log) Quality
Appendix Table 2. Summary Statistics
This table summarizes the variation in f.o.b. log export revenues, prices and inferred quality across firms,
products, and destinations in the 2002-2006 panel. The unit of observation is the firm-product-year triplet in Panel
A and the firm-product-destination-year quadruplet in Panel B. Log prices and log quality have been demeaned by
product-year pair fixed effects in Panel A and by destination-product-year triple fixed effects in Panel B.
Appendix Table 3. Export Prices and Sales
Panel A. Full Panel, 2002-2006
Dep Variable
(Sample)
Product Rank SalesRank, t=0
Price
Rank, t=0
Quality 
Rank, t=0
Sales Rank, 
t=1
Price
Rank, t=1
Quality 
Rank, t=1
Sales
Rank, t=0
Price
Rank, t=0
Quality 
Rank, t=0
Sales
Rank, t=0
Price
Rank, t=0
Quality 
Rank, t=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Product Rank 0.0007*** 0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0009*** -0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0122*** 0.0006 0.0069*** 0.488*** 0.354*** 0.408***
(12.58) (3.53) (11.43) (10.12) (-0.40) (10.06) (4.18) (1.40) (4.36) (17.46) (15.98) (19.01)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.79 0.76 0.77
# observations 347,288 347,288 347,288 407,412 407,413 407,414 143,881 143,882 143,883 143,881 143,882 143,883
# firms 42,521 42,522 42,523 42,521 42,522 42,523 37,867 37,868 37,869 37,867 37,868 37,869
Panel B. MFA Reform, 2004-2006
Dep Variable
(Sample)
Product Rank SalesRank, t=0
Price
Rank, t=0
Quality 
Rank, t=0
Sales Rank, 
t=1
Price
Rank, t=1
Quality 
Rank, t=1
Sales
Rank, t=0
Price
Rank, t=0
Quality 
Rank, t=0
Sales
Rank, t=0
Price
Rank, t=0
Quality 
Rank, t=0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Product Rank 0.0037*** 0.0025*** 0.0004*** 0.0040*** -0.0001*** 0.0026*** 0.0111*** 0.0004 0.0074*** 0.611*** 0.324*** 0.456*** 
(6.22) (7.98) (3.77) (5.38) (-59.94) (6.66) (3.14) (0.58) (3.32) (13.48) (20.01) (20.92)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.30 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.82 0.76 0.78
# observations 46,625 46,625 46,625 63,828 63,828 63,828 24,178 24,178 24,178 24,178 24,178 24,178
# firms 8,682 8,682 8,682 8,682 8,682 8,682 7,226 7,226 7,226 7,226 7,226 7,226
Appendix Table 4. Export Dynamics across Products within Firms: Product Ranks
This table examines how firms adjust activity across products over time as in Table 9, but focuses on the role of product ranks instead of continuous values for export revenues, price and quality. Panel A
considers adjustments within surviving firms from 2002 to 2006. Panel B considers adjustments within surviving firms in the textiles and apparel industries from 2004 to 2006 in response to the removal of
MFA quotas in 2005. In Columns 1-3 the sample includes all firm-products exported at t=0, and the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm does not export the product at t=1. In
Columns 4-6 the sample includes all firm-products exported at t=1, and the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the firm did not export the product at t=0. In Columns 7-9 the sample includes
all firm-products exported at both t=0 and t=1, and the dependent variable is the change in log revenues from t=0 to t=1. In Columns 10-12 the sample includes all firm-products exported at both t=0 and t=1,
and the dependent variable is the change in product rank from t=0 to t=1. Product rank is based on firms' worldwide log revenues, log price or log quality at t=0 or t=1 as indicated in the column heading. All
regressions include a constant term and firm fixed effects. Robust T-statistics in parentheses based on standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Drop Dummy, t=1
(Products traded at t=0)
Add Dummy, t=1
(Products traded at t=1)
Δ (log) Sales
(Products traded at t=0 & t=1)
Rank, t=1
(Products traded at t=0 & t=1)
Drop Dummy, t=1
(Products traded at t=0)
Add Dummy, t=1
(Products traded at t=1)
Δ (log) Sales
(Products traded at t=0 & t=1)
Rank, t=1
(Products traded at t=0 & t=1)
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